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Abstract 
The potential differing effects of causal attributions on both stress and coping in 
response to failing an exam were investigated. A 59 item questionnaire was 
distributed to 99 male and 90 female students from Canterbury University. The 
findings show that, as expected, external, stable, and uncontrollable attributions 
related positively to the self-reported stress level and negatively to the likelihood of 
seeking social support. In addition, the causal attribution stability moderated the 
relationship between total stress and seeking social support. Overall, coping was a 
better predictor of the stress level than the causal attributions. There were also some 
surprising gender effects. Females believed to more of a greater extent than males that 
they: 1) would experience more stress; 2) were more likely to seek social support; and 
3) would utilise more of a problem-focused strategy. The results are discussed in 
relation to the importance of the contextual model - the interaction between the 
situation and the person as an overall determinant of the likely coping strategies and 
causal ascriptions called forth, notwithstanding that the interaction is extremely 
influenced by one's cognitive appraisals. 
2 
Stress 
Stress is ubiquitous. People everywhere are expressing how stressed they are, 
whether they are at work, at home, or socialising. It would seem that from such 
chronic usage that stress is a plague and it is capable of destroying peoples' lives, not 
only because it relates to negative socio-emotional experiences like depression, but 
because it can be more relentless, possibly leading to death. This last suggestion may 
appear somewhat extreme, but the physiological toll the body endures from stress is 
capable of increasing the risk of say, cardiac infarction (Sarafino, 1998). What 
constitutes the likelihood of being a candidate for stress, in such a harsh sense, is 
distinguished by a myriad of factors, thereby making any research that is capable of 
identifying such factors very important. This thesis for example, is concerned with 
particular cognitive processes that are influencing stress reactions and subsequent 
coping responses. Consequently, the research entailed in this thesis will provide 
further support that how people think is indeed, influencing their stress reactions. 
This thesis, as mentioned is concerned with stress and some of the cognitive 
structures that are implicated. In this first chapter, I will define what stress is, provide 
a brief history of its first application and then move on, emphasising a more recent 
and widely accepted definition. Implicit in this definition is the process of cognitive 
appraisal, which is fundamental to stress because it distinguishes between stress cues 
of threat, harm/loss or challenge. After providing a detailed discussion of cognitive 
appraisal, I will next look at the emotional reactions as elements of a stressful episode, 
and then continue, providing a section that differentiates physiological stress from 
psychological stress. Last, I will discuss how arousal relates to stress, explicating the 
idea that arousal provides researchers with a physiological measure of stress, 
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notwithstanding its impact on performance. This chapter however, does not expect to 
reach all the boundaries of the stress rubric, but provide an overview that captures 
how cognitions play an important role in the stress process. 
What is stress? 
The first point is that I am talking in terms of psychological stress. In this 
regard, the environment and the human (notwithstanding the fact that stress exists for 
other organisms) are the two "major" factors involved in stress. On the one hand, 
research may focus on the former - environmental influences - describing stress as a 
stimulus (Sarafino, 1998). Events or circumstances that a person refers to as causing 
feelings of tension ( e.g., their job) are called stressors. On the other hand, research 
may focus on human reactions to stressors, treating stress as a response, and has two 
interrelated components (Sarafino, 1998). First, the psychological component involves 
emotions, thought patterns, and behaviour (e.g., feeling nervous). Second, the 
physiological component involves heightened bodily arousal ( e.g., dry mouth, heart 
pounding, and perspiration). The person's psychological and physiological response 
(biobehavioral response) to a stressor is called strain (Sarafino, 1998). 
It is important to note that the physiological and psychological components of 
stress are interrelated. Making a distinction between the two components is artificial, 
a practice that is only followed by each discipline ( e.g., physiology, endocrinology, 
psychology, anthropology, and so forth) and according to their own investigative 
concepts and techniques (Singer & Davidson, 1986). For example, the perspective 
used in this thesis will be psychological, and concerned with particular cognitions that 
may be influencing the biobehavioural response of stress. Needless to say, it is 
understood that other biological components may too be contributing to an 
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individual's reported stress. However, the idea that stress was indeed a biobehavioural 
response has not always been clearly stated in the stress literature. 
The early use of the term stress derived from the engineering use of the concept, 
as in stress-producing strain or focused on the physiological reaction of the organism 
to some outside threat (Singer & Davidson, 1986). Such work tended to focus on 
stimulus characteristics, attention, vigilance (in signal detection), and performance 
change (primarily decrement) under unusual input load and environmental conditions 
(Appley & Trumbull, 1986b). Selye (1936) first formulated a notion that the organism 
is reactive and little cognition is involved (cited in Singer & Davidson, 1986). He 
soon however, broadened his model to encompass a wider range of human situations, 
although the model essentially remained reactive; that is, stress was indicative of 
physiological and endocrinological changes. Moreover, Hans Selye's (1936, 1946, 
1950, 1955 cited in Appley & Trumbull, 1986) influence to the field of stress - the 
General Adaptation Syndrome (G-A-S)- encouraged clinical and experimental 
psychologists alike, "to define stress in terms of bodily response and to look for those 
conditions that would trigger this common, unitary, systematic reaction" (Appley & 
Trumbull, 1986, p. 5). Defining stress as a unitary or all-or-nothing phenomenon, was 
however, soon to be recognised as too inflexible due to the fact that "not all events 
that were presumed to be stressful turn out to be so; that even those that are in some 
manner demonstrably stressful are not necessarily so- or at least not uniformly so- for 
all individuals exposed to them; and that even the same individual exposed to the 
ostensibly same environmental stressor could react and/or be affected differently at 
different times or under different sets"(Appley & Trumbull, 1986, p.6). 
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In contradistinction to Selye's seminal work, views of stress have evolved such 
that it is described as a process, incorporating both stressors and strains, and thus 
adding an important dimension: the relationship between the organism and the 
environment (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984a, 1984b). Moreover, Lehman (1972) 
introduced the "transaction model" to establish that the presence or absence of a stress 
reaction was "a multiplicative function of both situational and individual 
characteristics" (p. 484). After reviewing the alternatives, Chalmers (1981) concluded 
that the now widely held view of"the environment - organism transaction approach 
appears to offer a realistic framework for stress research and theory" (p. 328). 
In recent times, there tends to be some agreement as to what is involved in the 
stress arena (e.g., Appley & Trumbull, 1986; Averill, 1973; Baum, Singer, & Baum, 
1981; Cohen & McKay, 1984; Coyne & Holroyd, 1982; Folkman, Lazarus, Dunkel 
Schetter, DeLongis, & Gruen, 2000; Lazarus, 1966; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984b; 
Pearlin, Menaghan, Lieberman, & Mullan, 1981; Singer & Davidson, 1986), hence 
most theorists referring "to any event in which environmental demands, internal 
demands, or both tax or exceed the adaptive resources of an individual, social system, 
or tissue system" (Monat & Lazarus, 1991, p.3 ). This is a broad definition of stress, 
thus highlighting the diversity of the stress arena - a diversity that is best explained by 
Lazarus ( 1966): 
It seems wise to use "stress" as a generic term for the whole area of problems 
that includes the stimuli producing stress reactions, the reactions themselves, 
and the various intervening processes. Thus, we can speak of the field of 
stress, and mean the physiological, sociological, and psychological phenomena 
and their respective concepts. It could then include research and theory on 
group or individual disaster, physiological assault on tissues and the effects of 
this assault, disturbances or facilitation of adaptive functioning produced by 
conditions of deprivation, thwarting or the prospects of this, and the field of 
negatively toned emotions such as fear, anger, depression, despair, 
hopelessness, and guilt. Stress is not any one of these things; nor is it a 
stimulus, response, or intervening variable, but rather a collective term for an 
area of study (p. 27). 
Where, then, does this leave me with respect to the question of what is stress? 
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This thesis will employ a cognitive-relational definition of stress in which stress is 
viewed as a relationship between the person and the environment that is cognitively 
appraised by the individual as personally significant and as taxing or exceeding 
resources (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984a). Moreover, it is clear that stress is best 
regarded as a complex rubric, like emotion, motivation, or cognition, rather than as a 
simple variable (Lazarus & Folkman, 1986). "The meaning sphere of stress is defined 
by many variables and processes that are reflected in the person's appraisal [ cognitive 
appraisal] of a relationship with the environment as relevant to well-being and taxing 
or exceeding his or her resources ... Changes in the relationship and how it is 
appraised by the person explain the flux observed in the short-term emotional 
reactions and behavior that flow from any person-environment encounter" (Lazarus & 
Folkman, 1986, p.70). According to this definition, the person is an active agent who 
can influence the impact of a stressor through, cognitive, behavioural, and emotional 
strategies. As a result, people differ in the amount of strain they experience from the 
same stressor, and the same person responds differently to the same stressor at 
different times. 
Cognitive Appraisal 
What is meant by cognitive appraisal? Appraisal is a key issue in the 
transactional model, a process through which the individual continually evaluates a 
given person-environment relationship with respect to its significance (primary 
appraisal) and resources and options for changing the relationship (secondary 
appraisal) (Folkman & Lazarus, 1991; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984a; Singer & 
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Davidson, 1991). "Appraisal is about personal meaning, an evaluation of the 
significance of what is happening for one's well-being" (Lazarus, 1990, p. 15). The 
meaning and emotional quality of every person-environment encounter is shaped by 
the convergence of both primary and secondary appraisal (Folkman & Lazarus, 1991). 
Moreover, the two are highly interrelated and importantly, sometimes a person's 
secondary appraisal of limited resources, or weakness, can lead to primary appraisals 
of threat where they would not otherwise occur (Coyne & Holroyd, 1982). The 
judgmental process of comparing demands to resources demonstrates the subjectivity 
involved and the dependency on one's evaluation of a situation when making 
appraisals. Such subjectivity helps account for individual differences in reactions to 
similar situations (Carpenter, 1992). 
Moreover, cognitive appraisal is a virtually continuous, multi-level monitoring 
process ( of appraisal and reappraisal), emphasizing feedback through the entire 
perception and coping sequence (Appley & Trumbull, 1986a). Notwithstanding the 
idea that the appraisal process is broken down into two stages ( an appraisal of the 
demand and an appraisal of one's competence to meet the demand), Appley (1986) 
conceived that at each step, the result(s) of appraisal and/or action would possibly 
alter the nature of the challenge or threat and of the ensuing coping requirement. In 
other words, a person continually monitors a demand, perhaps seeking new 
information, or taking action - doing anything that may possibly lead to the demand 
being reduced to an ostensibly manageable state. Allowing for new information or a 
shift in one's beliefs about the situation makes it easier to explain how the stress 
response may change over time (Carpenter, 1992). 
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Appraising Events as Stressful 
Stressful appraisals include appraisals ofhann/loss, threat, and challenge. 
Harm/loss refers to the amount of damage that has already occurred, as in harm to or 
loss of a job, a friendship, or self-esteem. A small amount of damage could be thought 
of as a "disaster," thereby exaggerating its personal impact and increasing the feeling 
of stress (Ellis, 1987). Threat refers to the expectation of future harm or loss - for 
example, when there is uncertainty about the outcome of a test. Stress appraisals seem 
to depend heavily on harm-loss and threat (Hobfoll, 1986). Challenge, on the other 
hand, refers to an opportunity for growth, mastery, or gain by using more than routine 
resources to meet a demand. For instance, a job promotion might be viewed as 
stressful by a worker, but also as an opportunity to gain new skills and make more 
money. "The intensity of an appraisal ofhann/loss, threat, or challenge depends on 
the relationship between the personal significance of the goal, commitment, or value 
that has been hanned, threatened, or challenged and the adequacy of the person's 
resources for managing the hann/loss, threat, or challenge" (Folkman, Chesney, 
Mchusick, Ironson, & Coates, 1991, p. 241). 
Appraising events as stressful depends on two types of factors - those that relate 
to the person and those that relate to the situation (Cohen & Lazarus, 1983; Lazarus & 
Folkman, 1984a). Personal factors include intellectual, motivational, and personality 
characteristics. People with high self-esteem for example, may perceive a stressful 
event as a challenge as opposed to a threat, believing they have the resources to meet 
demands with the strengths they possess (Cohen & Lazarus, 1983). Another example 
is linked to motivation: the more significant a threatened goal, then the more stress is 
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likely to be perceived (Paterson & Neufield, 1987). Irrational beliefs stemming from a 
person's belief system can also increase stress. Ellis (1987) notes: 
"Because I strongly desire to have a safe, comfortable, and satisfying life, the 
conditions under which I live absolutely must be easy, convenient and 
gratifying ( and it is awful and I can 't bear it and can't be happy at all when 
they are unsafe and frustrating)!" (p.373). 
A person who has such a belief is likely to appraise virtually any sort of 
inconvenience as harmful or threatening. 
What is it about situations that make them stressful? First, events that involve 
very strong demands and are forthcoming tend to be seen as stressful - an exam for 
example (Cohen & Lazarus, 1983; Paterson & Neufield, 1987). Moreover, the timing 
of a life transition can affect the stress it produces. People have expectations as to 
when some events, such as marriage or retirement should occur and any deviation 
from the expectation may be considered a loss. In addition, ambiguity- a lack of 
clarity in a situation - can also have an effect on stress appraisals (Quick & Quick, 
1984). Desirability of the situation is another factor that influences stress appraisals; 
generally, undesirable events are more likely to be appraised as more stressful than 
are desirable ones (Sarafino, 1998). Many aspects of the situation may influence the 
appraisal of stress; however, an important aspect for this thesis is controllability - a 
factor that will be discussed more fully in the next chapter. 
So far I have discussed a very small portion of what is now included under the 
rubric "stress" despite the fact that "the range of issues normally encompassed by 
single investigations is too truncated to observe the extended web of relationships that 
gives shape and substance to the [stress] process" (Pearlin, et al., 1981, p.337). 
Remember, however, that this thesis is concerned with psychological stress, although, 
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simultaneous and successive biological, interpersonal, and social cultural levels may 
be interdependent. 
In any case, it has been argued by Lazarus (1967) that the cognitive processes of 
appraisal and coping are crucial to psychological stress reactions. In other words, a 
person must appraise a future condition as harmful or threatening in order to feel 
stressed. Studies have illustrated the crucial role of appraisal in the production and 
reduction of threat and stress reactions. For example, Speisman, Lazarus, Mordkoff, 
and Davison, (1964) permit the conclusion that the same visual stimulus varies in the 
amount of stress produced depending upon the nature of the cognitive appraisal the 
person makes regarding its significance for him or her. Likewise, Lazarus, et al. 
(1965) test the generality of the principle that manipulation of beliefs about events can 
short-circuit threat; that is, a person can alter the cognitive process of appraisal so as 
to diminish or eliminate the stress response to a stimulus which otherwise would be 
threatening. Although not all their results were statistically significant, the direction of 
results was invariant, thus suggesting that the cognitive appraisal of the significance 
of what is apprehended is crucial in determining the emotional reaction to a stimulus. 
The point is that appraisals or one's beliefs about the situation underlie the production 
of threat. Hamlet's remark offers a poetic summation," ... for there is nothing either 
good or bad, but thinking makes it so" (Hamlet, Act II, Scene 2). 
Emotional reactions as elements of stressful episodes 
Emotions are a crucial part of stressful episodes (Perrez & Reicherts, 1992). It 
has already been mentioned that both primary and secondary appraisal shape the 
emotional quality and intensity of any stressful encounter, thus suggesting that 
appraisals can be analysed as antecedent conditions of emotional reactions. 
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Alternatively, emotions can be conceptualised as a consequence or outcome of efforts 
ofregulation (Folkman & Lazarus, 1988a). According to some prominent 
conceptions, if automated processes of emotional regulation fail to reinstall 
homeostasis, then stress and stress-related emotions emerge (Frijda, 1986; Leventhal 
& Scherer, 1987). Despite such prominent conceptions, simply, it is clear that a basic 
emotion like fear could result from a primary appraisal of threat. So, in the first 
instance of a stressful encounter, an emotional reaction has occurred, whether it was 
the result of conscious or unconscious efforts and the emotion is typically how 
stressful encounters are described (i.e., I am feeling stressed). 
The emotions that are common to stress tend to be negatively toned. Anxious, 
anger, depressed, helpless, and arguably 'stressed' are typical examples of emotional 
states that characterise a stressful encounter. Such emotions would characterise the 
course of a stressful episode, although, it will be discussed in the next chapter that as 
the situations unfolds, emotions can change, especially if coping is palliative. The 
change in emotion is obvious in a baby that is given some eye drops for say, 
conjunctivitis. At first, the drops are stressful due to their apparent cold, threatening 
and unpredictable nature. Needless to say, the baby does not cry forever - with some 
comfort and reassurance it soon settles to a calmer state. Given this state of affairs, 
seemingly the baby is stressed at first and then returns to a level of homeostasis when 
the threat is ameliorated, that is the eye drops warm and sooth the eyes and/or the 
caregiver provides the baby with a safe haven. 
I use the example of a baby to demonstrate that stress and its expressions are 
there from an early age. Indeed, as people grow older or learn from past experiences, 
their expressions and the antecedents to stress can become more complex due to 
developing cognitive processes whereby stress is not only a physiological reaction 
(the cold drops on the eyes), but may result from psychologically mediated 
mechanisms - the presentation of the eye drop bottle. 
Psychological versus physiological stress 
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In brief, I previously tried to draw a distinction between psychological stress 
and physiological stress -the later being more attuned to Hans Selye's seminal work 
on bodily responses. To elaborate, "physiological stress has to do with the visceral 
and neuro-humoral reactions of a person or animal to noxious stimulus agents and the 
physiological mechanisms that account for it" (Lazarus, 1967, p. 162). Further 
contributions by Hans Selye have shown that tissue systems are constructed with 
certain non-specific defenses against the disturbances produced by noxious stimuli. 
Moreover, long-term exposure to many different noxious agents on animals (these 
animals had no power to alter the aggravating or harmful circumstances - not real 
world experiences) always tended to bring about three morphological changes, 
namely (i) hypertophy of the adrenal cortices, (ii) atrophy of the thymus, and (iii) 
gastric ulceration (King, Stanley, & Burrows, 1987). Attention has mainly focused 
towards the adrenocortical system in studies with humans, which has proven to 
provide a convenient measure of acute reactions to the environment (King, et al., 
1987). It is worthwhile noting, however, that different 'stressors' are capable of 
producing a different profile of responses in the body chemistry system -
conspicuously, stressor-specific responses (King, et al., 1987). 
A physiological stress response can be produced by a noxious stimulus, whether 
the stimulus affects the person physically or psychologically. Noxious in the 
physiological sense is any condition that is disturbing or injurious to tissue structure 
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or function. For example, a sharp knife run across the skin would produce a wound, 
setting into motion the defensive processes that protect the system and restore the 
homeostatic steady state (Lazarus, 1967). If the knife was blunt however, a wound 
may not be produced, thus, in this case, the knife is not noxious in the physiological 
sense. In the psychological sense, the knife still may be noxious, that is, the mere 
expectation of what the knife could do to the skin may produce a stress reaction both 
psychologically and physiologically. The harm need not have actually occurred; it 
may only be anticipated. Herein lies the difference between a physiological and 
psychological stress response - "there must be an actual confrontation of the tissues 
by a noxious stimulus, and sufficient tissue reaction must be produced to serve as a 
signal for the activation of homeostatic mechanisms" (Lazarus, 1967, p. 162) prior to 
a physiological stress response, unlike a psychological stress response which only 
requires anticipation. In other words, the sequence of antecedent processes is quite 
different even though the appraisal of threat and physiological assaults appear 
eventually to produce similar responses. 
Arousal and stress - stress and performance 
Arousal is a term that often appears in the stress literature. King et al. (1987) 
consider the distinction between stress and arousal to be one of the most common 
sources of confusion in stress research; therefore, arousal warrants some attention 
here. Arousal generally refers to "a dimension of activity or readiness for activity 
based on the level of sensory excitability, glandular and hormonal levels and muscular 
readiness" (Reber, 1995, p. 54). Arousal is on a quantifiable continuum, at one end is 
sleep and at the other end is alertness (King, et al., 1987). Arousal is also common to 
the emotion literature, however, emotion has many qualitative continua that arousal 
does not best explain (King, et al., 1987; Lazarus, 1966). Arousal is a measure that 
enables a dimension for empirical investigation when a researcher is observing for 
whatever reason, a person's psychological reaction to an environmental stimulus. 
Arousal, according to those who study the processing of information, "generally 
means the quantity of attentional resources which are ( or may be) allocated to the 
current task" (King, et al., 1987, p.6). Arousal would be better understood as the 
positive aspect of the human response to a demand (Sanders, 1983). 
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The difference between arousal and stress is that "arousal appears to relate to 
the marshalling of resources to enable one to cope whereas stress is a negative 
emotion strongly associated with doubts about coping" (King, et al., 1987, p.6). In 
other words, heightened stress could lead to either a decrease or an increase in 
arousal, which in tum and all things being equal, can detract from performance 
(Sanders, 1983). The point is that, generally, stress and arousal are negatively 
correlated ( correlation coefficient approximately equal to - 0.2). I say "generally" 
because there is a group of people that King, et al. (1987) refer to as 'giants' who tend 
to increase in both arousal and performance under high levels of stress. Such 
exceptions are relatively rare - on average, stress usually reduces performance. 
Although there is a relationship between performance, stress and arousal, I need to 
highlight the point that arousal is independent of stress; arousal does change because 
of stress; arousal is a necessary part of emotion or mood state (Mackay, Cox, 
Burrows, & Lazzerini, 1978). As a result, it seems fair to say that both stress and 
arousal should be measured before it is possible to predict likely effects of either upon 
performance (King, et al., 1987). 
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Summary 
According to Lazarus (1966), there are three central issues in psychological 
stress: (1) What are the conditions and processes that determine when stress reactions 
will be produced and when they will not? For example, how does a person 
differentiate between benign conditions and damaging conditions? (2) What happens 
when a stimulus is reacted to as stressful? For example, how does the individual cope 
with stress and what factors influence the choice of coping process? (3) What are the 
patterns of reaction that define the presence of stress? It has been discussed that the 
reaction varies within and between the person; therefore, the issue is concerned with 
ascertaining what accounts for the variations. The focus of this thesis is concerned 
with the last issue, specifically, how the variations in stress response are related to 
intervening processes - namely, coping styles and attributions. 
Psychological-stress analysis as I present it in this thesis is distinguished from 
other types of stress analysis by the intervening variable of threat. The cognitive 
process of appraisal is crucial to the psychological stress response inasmuch as cues 
are evaluated or appraised for their potential harm or benefit. Such appraisals are 
influenced by features in the stimulus condition configuration ( e.g., degree of 
ambiguity, imminence of the harmful confrontation) and/or secondary appraisals of 
coping resources available to meet the demand. For the most part, an individual's 
psychological structure - general beliefs about the environment and one's resources 
for dealing with it will determine the psychological stress response. 
The next part of this thesis is to move forward and investigate some variables 
that, in part, define the psychological structure, namely attributions and coping 
processes, and ascertain if they have any bearing on anticipated stress levels. Of 
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course, coping processes are part of the psychological stress response; however, this 
thesis is concerned with the moderating effects of attributions on coping styles and the 
stress response. Moreover, does a particular coping strategy vary the stress level in a 
same stress situation? Before these questions can be investigated, I will first discuss 
both coping and attributions. 
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Coping 
The transition from stress to coping requires only a small step insofar as coping 
is connected to stress. "Both lay and scientific perspectives on coping typically 
highlight efforts of the individual or system to better respond to stress" (Carpenter, 
1992, p. 1). In other words, coping is how a person deals with stress -what 
behaviours or cognitions are, perhaps, subsequent to a stressor reflects what may be 
considered 'coping.' This is not to say, however, that coping is about successful 
outcomes or alleviating the stress; a mere coping effort, activity or behaviour in 
response to a demand suffices to characterise coping. In addition, by saying that 
coping occurs only when one is experiencing stress provides some problems. First, the 
definition of coping relies heavily on how stress is defined, which in itself has much 
debate. Second, people can learn to avoid stressors so they do not actually experience 
stress, yet they are still responding to a threat. So the question then becomes, what is 
coping? 
The purpose of this chapter is therefore, to investigate the above question. In 
addition, I will provide a transitory view of the relations between coping processes, 
threat and stress reactions, and secondary appraisal. Next, I will discuss two types of 
coping-problem- and emotion-focused. Despite the popular trend of the coping 
literature to refer only to the two aforementioned types, in addition I will discuss a 
third, and arguably distinct type of coping, namely seeking social support. Focusing 
on a cognitive relational view of both coping and stress, effective coping does not 
relate to successful outcomes; consequently, what is considered effective coping will 
be discussed in more depth, thus leading into further discussion on changeability and 
controllability. Although it is argued that coping is deployed in response to a specific 
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stressor, it is possible to expect that people will develop coping styles - this will be 
further elaborated before I examine coping as a mediator of emotion. Because this 
thesis is empirical, I have also included a section that centers on the measures of 
coping and distinguishes between attentional and coping processes. Last, I will briefly 
deliberate how coping develops over the life span, insinuating that people adopt more 
emotional type strategies as they grow older. But first, back to the main question -
what is coping? 
What is coping? 
Over the course of discussing stress, I focused on a cognitive-relational 
definition, emphasising characteristics of both the person and the situation in defining 
sources of stress and highlighting the appraisal process, which can ameliorate the 
stressful person-situation relationship. As mentioned, coping is also part of this stress 
process inasmuch as it refers to "changing cognitive and behavioural efforts to 
manage specific demands that are appraised as taxing or exceeding the resources of 
the person (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). The picture that emerges here is that coping, 
when referring to psychological stress theory, is a strategy that is employed to deal 
with threat rather than those being seen as synonymous with problem solving 
(Lazarus, 1966). 
The above definition offered by Lazarus and Folkman (1984) contains three 
important features: First, coping is process-oriented. Coping refers to what the person 
actually does or thinks, which can change as the situation unfolds. In 
contradistinction, structural, trait-oriented approaches refer to what the person usually 
does, would do, or should do. Second, the definition is contextual; it refers to what the 
person does or thinks within a specific context. This is important because one may 
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often hear a person mention that they are stressed from their job, thus making it 
difficult to identify what they are specifically coping with due to the generality of 
their comment. In other words, if a person were to say they were stressed because of 
the extra workload, then we could specifically identify how they were coping with the 
extra demand. Third, coping is defined without reference to its outcome; it refers to 
efforts to manage and not the success of these efforts. Coming to terms with situations 
or conditions that are beyond one's control is instrumental to effective coping -
mastering the situation is not always an option (Folkman, et al., 1991; Lazarus, 1966). 
Relations between Coping Processes, Threat and Stress Reactions, and 
Secondary Appraisal. 
The basic assumption of Psychological stress theory is that any stress reaction is 
a response to threat. Implicit in this argument is the idea that "observable threat and 
stress reactions are reflections or consequences of coping processes intended to reduce 
threat" (Lazarus, 1966, p. 152). Lazarus (1966) further argues that these action 
tendencies resulting from the appraisal of threat is an effort on the part of the 
individual to cope with the harmful condition by reducing or eliminating the 
anticipated harm. This functional process is determined by secondary appraisal, which 
in itself is a cognitive process. The point is that "not only does cognitive activity ( as 
primary appraisal) underlie threat, but it also ( as secondary appraisal) intervenes 
between threat and the coping process" (Lazarus, 1966, p. 155). Without such an 
intervening process, it would be difficult to explain the variations in both the coping 
strategies and stress reactions that are seen within and between each person even 
though stressors may be ostensibly the same. 
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Secondary appraisal may be described as an evaluation of the options for 
coping. A person may ask, for example, "What can I do?", after they have evaluated 
an encounter for its personal significance (primary appraisal). If no options become 
apparent; that is, the demands appear to exceed the individual's available coping 
resources, then the situation will be appraised as stressful. Laboratory studies have 
shown that the way an event is appraised indeed influences the subsequent coping 
strategy that is selected (Averill, O'Brien, & De Witt, 1977; Folkins, 1970; Monat, 
Averill, & Lazarus, 1972). 
Moreover, the resources that are available for coping may influence the coping 
process. Coping resources may include, for example, skills and abilities ( e.g., analytic 
skills, mechanical ability), social resources (people from whom one can obtain 
tangible, emotional, and information support), physical resources ( e.g., health), 
tangible resources (e.g., money with which to purchase goods and services), 
psychological resources ( control expectancies, morale, and self-efficacy beliefs), and 
institutional, cultural, and political resources (e.g., help groups and laws) (Folkman, et 
al., 1991). 
Appraisal and coping continually influence each other in that an appraisal of a 
situation as stressful motivates coping effort. As the person "copes," the situation 
changes or unfolds, which may lead to reappraisal. This continuous, bi-directional 
relationship between the person and the environment - each affecting and being 
affected by the other, is part and parcel of the transactional approach. The goal for the 
person, who is coping per se, is to return to an inner equilibrium or re-establish 
homeostasis by alleviating any discomfort caused by the stressor. 
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Two types of coping 
According to Folkman et al. (1991), coping serves two major functions: 
regulating distressing emotions ( emotion focused coping) and changing the problem 
that is causing the discomfort (problem focused coping). A third function is offered by 
Pearlin and Aneshensel ( 1986), namely, the adaptation of the circumstance giving rise 
to stress. Nevertheless, generally, situations in which the demands are appraised as 
amenable to resolution or change call for problem-focused forms of coping, whereas 
demands that are appraised as not changeable call for emotion-focused forms of 
coping. Problem-solving efforts are more likely to be used when individuals perceive 
that they have more control, power, or responsibility over the situation. Conversely, 
emotional strategies that can alter the meaning of the situation or the individual's 
emotional state are used when situations are perceived as uncontrollable (Folkman & 
Lazarus, 1990). Figure 1 shows the coping and appraisal processes and how the two 
are inter-related. 
A problem-focused form of coping includes behaviours or acts that attempt to 
alter or manage the problem. Cognitive problem solving and decision making, 
information gathering, and goal setting as well as problem-oriented behaviours such 
as joining a health club or dieting are some examples of problem-focused coping. 
Emotion-focused forms of coping are mental strategies that regulate emotion or alter 
the meaning of a situation, without changing the environment. For example, some 
emotion-focused techniques are cognitive reframing, minimization, distancing, denial, 
and escapism with drugs and/or alcohol. Such strategies are apt to be mainly palliative 
in the sense that they do not actually alter the threatening or damaging conditions but 
make the person feel better. Despite the distinct classification of these two strategies, 
complex combinations of problem- and emotion-focused methods are used to cope 
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Problem-focused coping 
Figure 1. Appraisal and coping model (Folkman, et al. 1991, p. 246). 
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Seeking Social Support 
When considering how an infant ideally seeks its caregiver in times of need or 
distress, it is easily recognised that there is a fundamental strategy that is primordial to 
say the least, namely seeking social support. Such a strategy makes sense in light of 
the voluminous literature documenting the benefits of social support, which cannot be 
comfortably placed in either problem- or emotion focused categories of coping 
(Amirkhan, 1998). The reason is that support is sometimes sought for information and 
advice, sometimes for understanding and sympathy, and sometimes for other reasons 
altogether. 
Folkman, et al. (1991) categorised seeking social support as problem solving, 
which means that by doing so, it could be expected that the person is attempting to 
change the person-environment situation. If a person was to say, seek sympathy from 
a close friend, this may not be an attempt to physically alter the problem, but more of 
an emotional strategy to make themselves feel better, without actually changing the 
environment. This is especially true if the problem happens to be the death of a loved 
one - a person has no controllability over the stressor nor can they change the 
outcome - the best strategy would be an emotional strategy or maybe to seek social 
support. The point is, a new taxonomy composed of all three categories - Problem 
Solving, Emotion Focused, and Support Seeking needs to be considered, 
distinguishing the latter from the other two. 
However, it is arguable that seeking social support clearly involves one of the 
other two strategies. That is, a person could seek support for sympathetic reasons or to 
ask a friend to help them alter the person-environment situation. Therefore, what 
distinguishes social support from the other two coping strategies is the inclusion of a 
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third party, a person who offers either emotional support or help with solving the 
problem. So despite its overlap with the main coping strategies, social support is 
nevertheless a valuable resource that does not have to be reduced to simple structure 
pertaining to emotion- or problem-focused coping, but recognised as a distinct coping 
strategy because it involves a social component that could be mutually exclusive in 
the other two strategies. 
Effective coping 
It was previously mentioned that effective coping is not defined in relation to its 
outcome. However, this depends on the choice of the underlying theoretical model. 
For example, in the animal model, effective coping is equivalent to performing 
adaptive tasks successfully (Folkman, 1991; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984a). The main 
theme of this thesis is on the contextual model, emphasising the relationship between 
the person and the environment in a specific context. For obvious reasons, this leads 
to a contextual definition of coping effectiveness. Such a definition centres on two 
types of fit: the fit between the reality and appraisal and the fit between appraisal and 
coping (Folkman, et al., 1991). 
"The fit between reality and appraisal refers to the match between what is 
actually going on in the person-environment transaction and the person's appraisal of 
that transaction (Folkman et al., 1991, p. 246). Maladaptive coping can result when a 
person seriously deviates from veridical appraisals. For example, on the one hand, a 
person appraising a harmful stimulus as benign may result in the person failing to put 
in place anticipatory coping mechanisms. On the other hand, a person appraising a 
benign situation as threatening can lead to unnecessary coping, thus deflecting their 
attention from other more pressing tasks. Then again, people can be realistic with their 
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appraisals of what is happening, but unrealistically appraise what resources or 
personal skills are available for coping with the demands. Being pessimistic about the 
available resources for example, could result in restricted coping efforts, whereas an 
overly optimistic appraisal ofresources could be detrimental to the outcome (Folkman 
et al. 1991). 
Changeability 
One factor that seems to be underpinning the choice of coping response is 
whether the person appraises the demands as either changeable or not changeable. In 
other words, in situations in which there is a potential for changing the outcome, it is 
appropriate to rely more on problem-focused coping as opposed to emotion-focused 
coping, which alternatively, is more appropriate for situations unamenable to change. 
Not recognising situations that can be changed or not changed, thus having a poor fit 
between situational appraisals of changeability and actual coping processes, should 
decrease the possibility for the management or reduction of distress and/or lead to 
situations not resulting in desired outcomes (Folkman et al. 1991). For example, Katz, 
Weiner, Gallagher, & Hellman, (1970) found that women awaiting breast tumor 
biopsy were more inclined to adopt emotion-focused strategies ( e.g., displacement, 
projection, denial, hope and pray~r), which ultimately, did not bring about the desired 
change. In effect, employing emotion-focused strategies like defensive behaviours 
(such as denial that a suspicious lump in the breast might be cancerous) have actually 
endangered the lives of individuals ( e.g., Katz, et al. 1970). This is not to say that 
emotion-focused strategies like denial or other defensive behaviours are always 
maladaptive. Such emotion-focused modes of coping may be extremely useful in 
helping a person maintain a sense of well-being, integration, or hope under conditions 
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( e.g., such as situations where the person would be otherwise overwhelmed by the 
unpleasant reality, where the likelihood of threats occurring is small, where there is 
nothing the individual can do to prepare for the potential threatening event, or where a 
hopeful attitude prevents feelings of giving up) otherwise likely to encourage 
psychological disintegration (Cohen & Lazarus, 1983). 
Changeability is also discussed by Perrez and Reicherts (1992), who use a 
situation-behaviour approach to stress and coping. They define changeability, as "the 
probability that the situation will change by itself; that is via its own dynamics ( e.g. 
the weather)" (p. 19). Changeability is an objective characteristic of the situation. The 
subjective appraisal that is of most concern when referring to changeability is whether 
the subject recognises the objective changeability; that is, that the situation will 
change by its own dynamics, without the subject's contribution. If the situation will 
change on its own accord, like the weather, then perhaps an emotion-focused strategy 
is more appropriate; the person need not apply a problem-focused strategy. For 
example, attempting to change the weather by sprinkling fairy dust, may be a wasted 
effort, which could result in the person becoming more frustrated and may in fact 
increase levels of distress because they did not achieve the desired outcome ( e.g., 
Cohen, Evans, Stolols, & Krantz, 1986). This is not to say that person could not move 
to a place where it is perhaps warmer (problem focused strategy) - indeed, this would 
be a fitting response if they wished to do something about the weather. The point is 
that it is considered adaptive if a person responds in a manner that reflects the 
changeability of the situation. 
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Controllability 
Whether a person appraises a situation as changeable or unchangeable is 
influenced by many factors. These factors, broadly speaking, could be categorised as 
physical, emotional, cognitive; social; and/or situationaL No one factor is mutually 
exclusive however, they all operate in unison characterising the demand, thus 
influencing coping. In a sense, this relates back to the aforementioned idea that stress 
is a rubric as opposed to a variable because many variables and processes are reflected 
in the person's appraisal of a relationship with the environment. One important factor 
for this thesis that falls under "situational" is controllability- namely, "controllability 
of a situation" (e.g., Miller, 1979; Monat et al., 1972). Being able to distinguish 
whether facets of the demand are within one's controllability will influence the 
amount of stress that one experiences. 
Controllability as an objective dimension of a situation refers to "the inherent 
opportunities for control within a situation" and as a subjective dimension, it is "the 
subjective appraisal of personal ability to control [have a positive influence on] the 
stressful situation" (Pen-ez & Reicherts, 1992, p. 26). Notwithstanding the fact that 
objective controllability would help ascertain a goodness of fit between coping 
strategies and the demand, a person's appraisal or their subjective alibility to control 
the situation would be influencing the coping response. If there is low changeability in 
a situation for example (e.g., not able to change by its own dynamics), then arguably, 
control behaviour will probably be elicited. What Perrez and Reicherts mean by 
control behaviour is not all that clear (I suspect that problem-solving behaviour that 
elicits a positive outcome is relevant), but reactions of helplessness and hopelessness 
are associated with poor control (e.g., Rosellini & Seligman, 1976). Moreover, control 
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may be elicited through mental strategies - for example, research conducted by 
Brandtstadter & Renner (1990) revealed a gradual shift from an assimilative to an 
accommodative mode of coping in older people; older people utilised their cognitive 
prowess as opposed to their brawn. Control is not always about physically tackling the 
situation, it can also involve a mental strategy that changes the meaning of the 
situation- namely, emotion-focused coping. 
"The fit between appraisal and coping refers to the fit between situational 
appraisals of controllability (secondary appraisal) and actual coping processes 
(Folkman, 1992, p. 42). It has already been discussed that problem-focused coping is 
more appropriate in situations that are amenable to change; that is, "in encounters that 
hold the potential for personal control, whether over the outcome of the particular 
encounter or its recurrence in the future" (Folkman, 1992, p. 42). Likewise, emotion-
focused coping is appropriate in encounters where there is little the individual can do 
to control the outcome or recurrence of the stressor. In other words, the effectiveness 
of coping strategies intended to change a stressful situation and those intended to 
regulate distressing emotions during a stressful encounter vary as a function of the 
perceived controllability of the stressor (Compas, Malcame, & Fondacaro, 1988a; 
Forsythe & Compas, 1987). Let us not forget however, that the issue is more 
complicated than the prescription suggests inasmuch as there is interplay between 
both forms of coping. An emotion-focused strategy like denial for example, could be 
utilised in reducing any immediate anxiety that is inhibiting a person from 
concentrating on the problem at hand - say, taking a test. The expected patterns of 
coping should include both major coping functions, but the secondary appraisals of 
control should differentiate the relative amounts of problem- and emotion-focused 
forms of coping that are utilised (Folkman & Lazarus, 1980). 
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What is it about control that makes it so pertinent to coping or stress in general? 
To answer this question, I tum to the research on happiness, life satisfaction, positive 
mental health, and depression, which all support the claim that the belief that one's 
actions can produce desired outcomes is essential to emotional well-being 
(DeCharms, 1972; Seligman, 1975). The underlying theme is the belief that a 
contingency exists between personal agency and desired outcome (Rotter, 1966). For 
stress reduction, control may either provide better predictability, thereby allowing for 
the preparation of defensive mechanisms to combat stress and provide better 
outcomes ( e.g., Seligman, 1968, safety signal hypothesis) or because having control 
ensures that the situation will not become intolerable ( e.g., Miller, 1979a, minimax 
hypothesis). Although much of this early investigation was completed on rats, more 
recent research has led to similar findings on perceptions of control as individuals 
undergo naturally occurring stressful events, such as surgery, chronic illness, or 
bereavement. Some research supports the idea that perceptions of control contribute to 
adaptive coping with life stressors (e.g., Affleck, Tennen, & Gershman, 1985; Baum, 
Fleming, & Singer, 1983; Stroebe, Stroebe, & Domittner, 1988; Taylor, Lichtman, & 
Wood, 1984; Thompson, Bundek, & Sobolew Shubin, 1990; Thompson, Sobolew 
Shubin, Graham, & Janigian, 1989; Worchel, Copeland, & Barker, 1987). 
The basic idea is that control leads to better outcomes. Control over what? 
Control over the environment, control over other peoples' behaviour, control over our 
emotions, or control over our thinking? Which one of these is it? According to 
Thompson (1981), four types of control- behavioural, cognitive, information, and 
retrospective - relate to reactions to aversive stimuli. Behavioural control, in the stress 
context, is having a behavioural response that can affect the aversive event, which 
lessens or prevents anxiety and anticipatory physiological arousal. Cognitive control 
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is believing that one has a cognitive strategy that can mitigate the aversiveness of an 
event by lessoning anticipatory anxiety, reducing the impact of the stimulus, and 
improves the postevent effects. Informational control can take one of four forms: a 
warning signal; information about the sensations they will experience; information 
about the procedures they are about to undergo; or information about the causes of an 
event. Such information however, according to Miller (1989), will not always reduce 
the aversiveness of an event, especially if people are high self-monitors (i.e., those 
who typically shape their behaviours to project the impression they think their current 
audience or situation demands, unlike low self-monitors, who behave in ways that 
express their internal attitudes and dispositions). Last, retrospective control refers to 
the attribution of responsibility for past events, basically assuming that attributing 
responsibility to oneself is a way of asserting control and preserving one's sense of 
personal control; that is, seeing oneself as causing the event is one way of making 
sense out of it. "This is not the only way in which meaning can be assigned to an 
event, and it is probably the meaning, not necessarily the sense of control, that is 
important" (Thompson, 1981, p. 96). In its most broadest sense, "control" for this 
thesis refers to the belief that one has at one's disposal a response that can influence 
the aversiveness of an event. 
Dispositions 
So far, I have focused on the contextual aspects of coping, highlighting what the 
person actually thinks or does in a stressful encounter, and distinguishing some of the 
characteristics that are inherent in the transaction ( e.g., changeability and control). 
However, recognising that there is a double involvement between the person and the 
environment, then I need to consider what the individual brings to the transaction, 
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insofar as a person is equipped with a plethora of experience (unless of course they 
are a baby) from past encounters where they have had the chance to develop, for 
example, a sense of self efficacy. What I am referring to here is the dispositional 
characteristics that are inherent in the person and are influencing their appraisals. 
Notably, some authors object to trait or dispositional concepts because of their low 
predictive value and suggest that they fail to capture the changing nature of the coping 
process ( e.g., Lazarus and Folkman, 1984). The debate surrounding the trait versus 
situation-specific behaviour is not of concern for this thesis. Nevertheless, I will say 
that when developing intervention programs for the prevention of undesirable 
outcomes, then seemingly, information about people (e.g., dispositions) would be 
critical to predict actual behaviour and outcomes (Krohne, 1986). 
Dispositional characteristics provide people with a stable, consistent pattern of 
behaviour across a range of circumstances. For example, if a person were considered 
to be efficacious, then we could expect such a person to remain persistent or task 
oriented in the face of pressuring situational demands and their responses generated 
from positive or negative affect when exercising control over stressors would be 
different to those who doubt their self-efficacy (Bandura, 1982, 1995). The point is, 
"the effects of situational manipulations can, in part, be reconciled by considering 
dispositional preferences for information, coping, and control" (Miller, 1992, p. 79). 
Implicated in the notion of dispositional preferences is the idea of coping styles. 
Coping styles reflect consistencies in the strategies used by individuals over time in a 
single stressful episode and/or across different stressors. These are not the same as 
personality traits however, as styles may reflect preferred ways of coping under 
certain circumstances rather than a consistent style independent of situational 
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demands (Campas, Malcarne, & Banez, 1992). Despite the distinction between 
personality traits and coping styles, there is evidence that some personality 
dimensions - neuroticism, extraversion, and openness to experience - are 
systematically related to coping strategies (McCrae & Costa, 1986). Some individuals 
may repeatedly use the same strategy, nevertheless, others may vary their coping with 
the demands of the situation, thus suggesting a variation in the degree of consistency 
that individuals display (Campas, Forsythe, & Wagner, 1988b). As a result, 
unidimensional measures like coping-trait measures (usually depicted along an 
approach-avoidance continuum) are poor predictors of how a person copes inasmuch 
as coping has been shown to be a multidimensional phenomenon (Aldwin & 
Revenson, 1987; Billings & Moos, 1984; Carver, Scheier, & Weintraub, 1989; Felton, 
Revenson, & Hinrichsen, 1984; Folkman, Lazarus, Dunkel_Schetter, DeLongis, & 
Gruen, 1986; McCrae, 1982; Stone & Neale, 1984) In essence, trait-measures are 
generally inadequate with respect to describing the complexity and richness of actual 
coping processes (Carpenter, 1992). 
Coping as a Mediator of Emotion 
When exploring the relationship between coping and emotion, Folkman and 
Lazarus (1988) argue that coping is a mediator of emotion. Coping, in other words, 
affects emotional responses that tend to accompany stress. "Emotions depend on 
cognitive appraisals of the significance of the person-environment relationship for the 
individual's well-being and the available options for coping" (Folkman & Lazarus, 
1988a, p. 466). Further, the relationship between emotion and coping in a stressful 
encounter is bi-directional, with each affecting the other. 
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In the first instance, a transaction is appraised as harmful, beneficial, 
threatening, or challenging. The appraisal process generates emotion, which, along 
with the appraisal influences the coping processes and changes the person-
environment relationship. A reappraisal of the altered person-environment occurs and 
leads to a change in emotion quality and intensity. Coping in this view, is a mediator 
of the emotional response (see Figure 2). Folkman and Lazarus (1988) demonstrated 
this process in that coping was associated with changes in four types of emotions -
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Figure 2. Coping as a mediator of emotion (Folkman & Lazarus, 1988). 
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Measuring Coping 
I have already provided a clue as to how coping is generally assessed. 
Specifically, I am referring to Lazarus's model of coping, which looks at stress from a 
process vantage point (remembering that coping is a process in relation to a stress 
response). Such practices are concerned with what the person thinks or actually does 
to cope, unlike the trait measures that are mainly concerned with what people would 
or should do. Due to the unfolding nature of the coping process, the cognitive 
structures and behaviours that people actually employ in stressful circumstances are 
of consequence. 
Moreover, early practices relied on clinicians inferring the underlying cognitive 
structures utilised by those coping, unlike self-report questionnaires, which 
objectively quantified peoples' coping thoughts and actions and have been successful 
since the end of the 1970s (Folkman & Lazarus, 1980; Billings & Moos, 1981; Pearlin 
& Schooler, 1978). The most popular of these questionnaires is Folkman and 
Lazarus's (1980, 1988b) Ways of Coping Inventory (WCI) and literally hundreds of 
scientific reports have used it. Revised scales of the WCI have divided coping 
strategies into six core dimensions of coping: focus on coping ( also labelled problem-
solving, information seeking, and instrumental action); seek support (also called 
support mobilization); focus on positive (also labelled positive reappraisal, growth, 
cognitive restructuring, and seek meaning); threat minimization (also called 
distancing, or detachment); escape-avoidance (also called wishful thinking); and 
accept responsibility ( also labelled self-blame). Whatever the merits of the 
questionnaire, and it is not without its critics, the same factor structures have 
essentially been found across eleven studies of different populations of subjects 
(Marshall & Dunkel-Schetter, 1987). 
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What specifically do the critics object to when self-report measures are 
employed? The first point relates to the changing nature of coping. The WCI is 
usually employed as a retrospective assessment of coping over previous periods. As a 
result, information about the patterning of coping is lost, thus not revealing when 
during the period and in what order particular strategies were used. Second, self-
reporting measures are not without their pitfalls. People do not always remember 
events and their actions veridically. Smith, Leffingwell, & Ptacek, (1999) found on 
average, only 25% shared variance between the daily and retrospective accounts of 
people coping over a 7-day period. Measures obtained in closer proximity to the event 
and coping and while they are fresh in the subject's mind may be a more accurate 
means of measuring because they are less subject to memory distortions such as 
selective memory and failures of memory (Stone & Neale, 1984). In hindsight, studies 
employing retrospective accounts of how people coped are liable for the most 
criticism. 
Another issue that arises when measuring coping is automatic verse controlled 
behaviour. "Automatic processes grow out of one's frequent and consistent 
experience, so that they represent the regularities of that experience. Routine 
conscious processes ... become subsumed by efficient automatic processes that 
operate without the need for conscious guidance, attention, or awareness" (Wegner & 
Bargh, 1998, p. 463). The necessity of conscious attention need only apply when a 
regularly used strategy does not work, when one is in a new situation, or when 
unexpected problems and difficulties arise (Frese & Sabini, 1985). According to 
Frese, (1986): 
"Only when the normal, easy to use, automatic coping strategies 
do not work do we think of them consciously. This notion has 
implications for measuring coping. If coping strategies are 
checked off on a questionnaire, only consciously used strategies 
will be checked. This means that problematic coping strategies 
will be reported more often than nonproblematic (i.e., 
automatically used) ones. Therefore, this theory would suggest 
that measuring coping with questionnaires (e.g., like the one used 
by Lazarus and co-workers,) leads to reporting problematic 
coping strategies, although indirect measurement of coping (that 
includes automatic coping) will have different relations with 
psychological functioning. Conscious and problematic coping 
strategies should be positively related to psychological 
dysfunctioning although automatic coping strategies should be 
negatively related (p. 185). 
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Accordingly, Frese's result confirmed his hypothesis: "The most consistent findings, 
so far, are the simple correlations between coping and psychosomatic complaints. 
These are nearly all positive-meaning more coping leads to more psychosomatic 
complaints" (p. 196). 
The jury is still out as to the accurateness ofFrese's account, mainly because 
more recent studies, seemingly contradict his methodological stance concerning the 
automated ness of coping. For example, Compas and Boyer (2001) provide the 
following definition of coping: 
We define coping as conscious volitional efforts to regulate 
emotion, cognition, behavior, physiology, and the 
environment in response to stressful events or circumstances. 
Optimal coping is planful, strategic, organized, goal directed, 
linguistically based, and context-specific. Coping is a subset 
of responses to stress, with coping referring to regulatory 
efforts that are volitionally and intentionally enacted 
specifically in response to stress. Regulation involves a broad 
array ofresponses, including efforts to (a) initiate, (b) 
terminate or delay, ( c) modify or change the form or content, 
( d) modulate the amount or intensity of a thought, emotion, 
behavior, or physiological reaction, and (e) redirect thought 
or behavior toward a new target. Coping is a subset of self-
regulatory processes; therefore, it is important to recognize 
that self-regulation includes responses in nonstressful 
circumstances that are not characterized as coping. These 
regulatory processes both draw on and are constrained by the 
biological, cognitive, social, and emotional development of 
the individual. An individual's developmental level 
contributes to the resources that are available for coping and 
limits the types of coping responses the individual can enact 
(p. 6). 
Note the above definition specifically emphasised coping as being conscious and 
volitional. It is evident that people do not normally suffer distress passively; they 
attempt to manage the demands placed on them through various coping strategies 
(Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). 
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Compas and Boyle's (2001) description of a stress response is different to Frese 
(1985) in that they refer to a dual process. The dual processes are reflected in a system 
of involuntary, automatic response processes and a second system of voluntary, 
controlled responses. Both involuntary and voluntary responses to stress can be 
further distinguished as engaging with, versus disengaging from, the source of stress 
and one's emotional responses to the stressor. The origins of the engagement-
disengagement dimension can be found in the concept of the automatic fight 
( engagement) or flight ( disengagement) response and in the contrast between 
approach and avoidance responses. Within the dual-process model of stress responses, 
coping involves only voluntary response processes, whereas attention to threatening 
and stressful information involves both involuntary and voluntary response systems. 
Attention is deployed before the initiation of coping responses and permits individuals 
to orient toward and appraise potential stressors. In addition, once coping strategies 
have been engaged, attentional processes are continually engaged to assess the status 
of the stressor, monitor changing environmental or internal inputs, and facilitate 
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certain coping strategies that involve shifting and focusing attention. Frese does not 
make this classification (between attentional and coping processes) in his study and 
the coping strategies he measures, arguably, seem to orient more to the attentional 
processes of engaging and disengaging ( e.g., denial, socially focussed, brooding, 
socially oriented, diverting attention, repression, avoidance, and over-reporting). If 
indeed Frese has not measured coping but surveyed attentional processes, then it 
makes sense that focusing attention towards threatening stimuli results in magnifying 
the actual stressor, which could result in increased distress (Compas & Boyer, 2001; 
Mathews & MacLeod, 1994; Walker, Smith, Garber, & Van Slyke, 1997). Needless to 
say, more research is needed to investigate the application of overleamed coping 
strategies and their effects before the jury can make a final verdict. 
Coping and Development 
As people grow older, coping strategies need to develop in order to enable them 
to adapt to the demands that are coupled with an imminently changing developmental 
ecology. Changes in development are the result of biological, cognitive, and 
socioemotional processes that are working in concert throughout the human life cycle. 
Basically, the morbid reality is that human beings are born to die, a cycle that is 
characterised by gains and losses; that is, as a person grows older their developmental 
ecology becomes more constrained because developmental losses begin to exceed any 
gains (Heckhausen, 1997). As a result, survival requires the person to cope with, not 
only the losses of old age, but the gains that permit an adult human to function 
primarily as a social being in their ecology. 
Initially, infants regulate functions of arousal, behavior, and emotions through 
automatic, biologically based processes (Derryberry & Rothbart, 1997; Gunnar, 
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1994), which are later augmented by responses that are acquired through learning and 
experience, although they remain automatic inasmuch as they are controlled by 
environmental cues that elicit and maintain behavior (Compas & Boyer, 2001; 
Rothbart, 1989). For example, during the early stages of life, regulation of fear may 
be primarily automatic and reactive; however, additional cortical development 
increases the child's capacity for voluntary or effortful forms of control (McNally, 
1995; Rothbart, Posner, & Boylan, 1990). 
Coping strategies are influenced by the emergence of cognitive and behavioral 
capacities for regulation of the self and the environment, including the emergence of 
intentionality, representational thinking, language, metacognition, and the capacity for 
delay (Compas & Boyer, 2001). With the development of more complex language 
capacities emerging in early to middle childhood, more complex methods of 
achieving the goals of emotional palliation and problem solving tend to surface, thus, 
as expected, providing greater diversity and flexibility in the range of coping 
responses available to the individual. It is also expected that, as cognitive skills are 
increasing, young adolescences will demonstrate a greater ability to match coping 
efforts to the perceived and/or objective characteristics of stress (Compas & Boyer, 
2001). 
As people grow older they tend to shift from problem- to emotion-focused 
coping. Possibly the main reason for this change in coping style is because attentional 
focus shifts from gains to losses. The elderly report more stress relating to health than 
younger people, whilst middle-aged individuals report more stress relating to work, 
finances, and family and friends (Brandtstaedter & Renner, 1990; Folkman, Lazarus, 
Pimley, & Novacek, 1987; Heckhausen, 1997). The elderly do not have the strength 
or faculty they once perceived thereby appraising situations as less changeable, 
nevertheless maintaining a sense of control by using more of an accommodative 
(emotion-focused) mode of coping (Brandtstaedter & Renner, 1990). 
Summary 
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Coping relates to stress. In essence, coping is the way that people deal with 
stress, therefore making it an important process because it not only palliative, but it is 
the instrumental basis for how a person attempts to modify or adapt to the stress. In 
other words, being able to cope enables a person to function in their ecology; 
otherwise prolonged stress could have detrimental results to a person's overall morale, 
social functioning and somatic health. 
This thesis has focused on a cognitive-relational definition of stress and coping. 
This implies that stress results from a transaction between the person and the 
environment that is appraised as harm-loss, threat, or challenge and coping serves to: 
(1) alter the troubled transaction through an instrumental or problem solving strategy; 
and/or (2) manage the somatic and subjective component of the stress emotions (e.g., 
anxiety, anger, depression), without changing the actual person-environment 
relationship. However, these two types of coping are not mutually exclusive, they 
operate in unison and constantly change the person-environment relationship, thereby 
suggesting that coping is continuously changing as the encounter unfolds - shifts in 
the situation may also be independent of the person. 
An important aspect of coping, with its emphasis on the relationship between 
the person and the environment in a specific context, is the fit between reality and 
appraisal and the fit between appraisal and coping. In the contextual model attention 
is given to the quality of coping, regardless of its outcome. The fit between appraisal 
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and coping refers to the fit between situational appraisals of controllability (secondary 
appraisal) and actual coping processes. It has been discussed that, generally, problem-
focused-coping is appropriate in encounters that hold the potential for personal 
control, unlike emotion-focused coping, which is appropriate in encounters where 
there is little the individual can do to control the outcome or recurrence. There are 
many factors that distinguish whether a persons perceives the controllability of a 
situation and dispositions were inferred as having some influence over the selection of 
coping strategy. The next part of this thesis takes a further look at dispositional 
characteristics - namely causal attributions, which may or may not effect the stress 
reaction and/or the subsequent coping strategies. 
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Causal Attributions 
Good and bad events occur to almost everyone in life. For example, take a 
student who has just failed an exam. This student may be interested in why they failed 
- maybe because they lacked effort in their preparation, or the exam was harder than 
expected. The layperson and the scientist alike try to find the causes of why an event 
happened, so then perhaps, they can understand, predict, or influence any likely future 
occurrences of the event- whether it be' good' or 'bad'. In essence, assumptions are 
formulated about causes or why things happen - these assumptions are referred to as 
causal attributions. 
While this chapter is about perspectives on attribution, I would like to point out 
that there is no monolithic theory in this domain of work. Rather, there are several 
theoretical approaches to causal attribution processes, each of which has some 
similarities to and differences from the others. These attribution conceptions are 
primarily concerned with the process of making an attribution, however, there are 
some analyses that are concerned primarily with the consequences of arriving at a 
given attribution, thus formulating an attributional theory. There are attribution-based 
theories of emotion, achievement, motivation, affiliation, helping, revenge, and 
equity. In this chapter, I will mainly focus on an attributional theory of achievement 
motivation and emotion (Weiner, 1985, 1986). 
In the following pages, an abbreviated description of attributional theory of 
motivation will be presented. The first part of this chapter will look at what causal 
attributions are and concludes that attributional search not only starts at infancy, but is 
shaped by such ontogenic experiences. In line with Weiner's attributional model, the 
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next section explores the content of causal thinking and explicates a three dimensional 
taxonomy. With regards to this taxonomy, I will next highlight some of the general 
findings currently established, and then continue to discuss how attributions predict 
future performance and how they influence motivation and emotion. The last section 
looks at explanatory styles, people's habitual schemas as to why things happen, 
whereby there is evidence to suggest that such styles can potentially impact on 
peoples' wellbeing. But first, what is a causal attribution? 
Attributional Theory 
"An attribution is an inference about why an event occurred or about a person's 
dispositions or other psychological states ... Attributions may be perceptions and 
inferences about others or about self' (Weary, Stanley, & Harvey, 1989, pp. 3-4). 
Traditional attributional research endeavours to discover what attributions people 
make, and how they use available information to come to those particular attributions. 
In the main, why people make causal attributions has already been addressed. As 
mentioned previously, laypeople are basically naive scientists who make inferences or 
assumptions from their encounters or experiences with the environment, thereby 
establishing etiological ( causal) conclusions that may enable their ecology to become 
more predictive (Kelley, 1971). In simpler words, ideally it is a requirement for 
people to learn and gain knowledge about the causes of outcomes that result from 
their encounters with the environment, so they can either promote adaptation and 
survival (functionalism, which often is linked with hedonism) or, if this basic survival 
drive is already accomplished, then to better understand oneself and the environment 
(mastery) (Weiner, 1986). 
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Once a person has assigned a cause to an outcome (gained knowledge), then this 
can become a prescription or guide for future endeavour. If the prior outcome was 
successful, then there is a likely chance that prior causal networks may be reinstated 
in the future. So, for example, if I believe a lot of study produces a favourable grade 
in an exam, then I am likely to study hard for future exams. On the other hand, if the 
prior outcome or event was undesired, such as I failed the exam, then there is a strong 
possibility that I will attempt to alter the causes to produce a different (more positive) 
effect. Basically, "causes are constructions imposed by the perceiver ( either an actor 
or observer) to account for the relation between an action and an outcome. Note that 
causal ascription as used here refers to why an outcome has occurred, as opposed to 
why an action has taken place (Weiner, 1986). Weiner further argues that such 
construction building or attributional search is in fact spontaneous. 
Attributional search is promoted by nonattainment rather that attainment of a 
goal (political loss, defeat in a sports contest, examination failure, poor job 
performance and negative interpersonal behavior), especially with achievement 
related outcomes (Weiner, 1986). Consider for example a person who passes an exam 
with a satisfactory grade - the cause of the outcome does not necessarily need to be 
analysed because the goal has been achieved (unless of course they are surprised by 
the outcome). In contrast, failing the exam is likely to thwart the goal achiever, 
rendering them into an uncomfortable, regrettable, and possibly dysfunctional state - a 
state that a person would otherwise avoid if they had the chance. "The law of effect 
captures the idea that organisms are motivated to terminate or prevent a negative state 
of affairs. Effective coping importantly depends on locating the cause(s) of failure. In 
this case, attributional search more clearly severs an adaptive, and therefore, hedonic, 
function" (Weiner, 1966, p. 33). 
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Moreover, unexpected outcomes also stimulate causal thinking (e.g., passing an 
exam with a high grade when expecting a simple pass). Unexpected outcomes are 
novel events, thus promoting exploration or curiosity (Berlyne, 1960; Berlyne, 
Koenig, & Hirota, 1966; Berlyne, Craw, Salapatek, & Lewis, 1963). Implicated in this 
is the idea that in the face of uncertainty, attributional search can be considered one 
instance of the more general class of exploratory behaviours elicited (Weiner, 1986). 
Infants display a fine example of exploratory attributional search, dependent, of 
course, on their attachment (see Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, & Wall, 1978). The 
attachment behavioural system is largely governed by a "general systems 
perspective," which, in part, refers to the attachment between infant-caregiver as a 
protective bond (Marvin & Britner, 1999). At its most basic level, it has a component 
that facilitates the youngster's tendency to explore and learn, and to become more 
independent, and in moments of distress a responsive or sensitive caregiver(s) is 
physically accessible and available for help and/or protection. The infant experiences 
him or herself as competent to produce desired and prevent undesired outcomes, 
based on their history of interactions with the environment (Skinner, 1992). In tum, 
the infant develops representations or internal working models (Bowlby, 1980) of its 
experiences; that is, the infant assimilates or accommodates cause and effect patterns 
from its social and environmental interactions. These working models are the filters, 
which shape social experiences and construct self-understanding (Thompson, 1999). 
In part, the infant may develop models that would enable him or her to make 
predictions or expectations about the likely outcomes of future transactions, both with 
the physical and social environment; in other words, the infant develops a construct of 
perceived control. As one can see, from the earliest stages of life the attributor (the 
individual) is influenced or biased as to how they perceive or attribute causes. 
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The Content of Causal Thinking 
As the infant grows up and becomes an adult, a myriad of cause and effect 
scenarios would have been encountered or explored. Categorising all the perceived 
causes for successes and failures would be almost impossible when taking into 
account the numerous different experiences that an adult, or even a child encounters. 
For example, in achievement-related situations, causal prescriptions have included 
task difficulty, luck, effort, ability, interest, and mood just to name a few (Weiner, 
1986). These prescriptions have come a long way from Reider's (1958) (the founder 
of attribution theory) first prescriptions of internal verse external causal attributions. 
Heider (1958) posited that people search for the causal structure of events by 
either attributing to the environment ( external attribution) or to something in the 
person involved in the event (internal attribution). Types of external attributions 
include those attributed to the social and physical circumstances surrounding the 
action, while types of internal attributions include those attributed to the actor's 
ability, attitude, motivation, or emotional state. For example, a student may infer that 
his exam failure was a result of the test being too difficult. This inference represents 
an external attribution. On the other hand, an internal attribution would be represented 
by the student's inference that his exam failure was a result of his lack of motivation 
or effort in studying for the exam. Of course, the student may arrive at a conclusion 
that a mixture of these internal and external factors caused his exam failure. 
Notwithstanding the hallmark of Reider's work in that his internal-external 
dimensions provided the grounding for causal attribution, more dimensions were 
needed because some causes fluctuated while others remained constant (Weiner, 
1986). For example, although ability is perceived as a relatively constant capacity, 
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causal factors like mood and effort are perceived as more variable, changing from 
moment to moment or from one time interval to the next. This also holds true for 
external causes. If for example, a test were made easy at the beginning of a course 
and grades were relatively high, then future tests may be made harder to bring down 
the grade average. Causes within an identical grouping (internal and external) have 
the ability to differ; therefore, an additional causal dimension was needed to capture 
this dissimilarity, namely stable and unstable. This additional dimension of causality 











Figure 3. Locus X Stability classification scheme (Weiner, 1986) 
When one takes a closer look at mood, fatigue, and temporary effort, it can be 
recognised that they are all internal and unstable causes. But effort is distinguishable 
from the other two when one considers volitional control - an individual can increase 
or decrease expenditure of effort, unlike the mood and fatigue, which under most 
circumstance cannot be willed to change (Rosenbaum, 1972, cited in Weiner, 1985). 
As a result, controllability was added to the causal attribution taxonomy. And rightly 
so, the belief that one has control over their life and circumstances deters for example, 
helplessness, depression, maladaptive stress reactions and a variety of other 
undesirable psychological states and consequences ( e.g., Abramson, Seligman, & 
Teasdale, 1978; Affleck, Tennen, Pfeiffer, & Fifield, 1987; Averill, 1973; Compas, et 
al., 1988a; Compas, Banez, Malcarne, & Worsham, 1991; Folkman, 1997; Geer, 
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Davison, & Gatchel, 1970; Jenkins, 1979; Karuza, Zevon, Gleason, Karuza, & Nash, 
1990; Langer, Janis, & Wolfer, 1975). 
Rotter ( 1966) first introduced the idea that people could have an internal and 
external perception of control ( of reinforcement), which created some difficulties for 
Weiner, (1979). Within the three-dimensional taxonomy, two of the proposed causal 
properties are labelled locus and control. A cause like math aptitude could be 
perceived as internal and uncontrollable ( determined by skill and ability) by a failing 
student because he/she considers aptitude to be genetically determined. According to 
Rotter's dimension however, this indicates that the outcome is perceived as subject to 
internal control - not uncontrollable. The confusion lies in Rotter's one-dimensional 
taxonomy. Causal perceptions are described by locus and control, not locus of control 
(Weiner, 1985). The locus dimension has therefore, been labelled locus of causality to 
avoid confusion. 
There is a plethora ofresearch for and against the use of the three constructs. As 
previously mentioned, the layperson will have a myriad of causal constructs that 
describe their outcomes, which will not be as global or epistemological as the 
attribution theorists. Despite such distinctions, various research using factor or cluster 
analysis (Meyer, 1980; Meyer & Koelbl, 1982) and multidimensional scaling 
(Michela, Peplau, & Weeks, 1982) support the contention that there are commonly 
three dimensions or properties of perceived causality. Moreover, the empirical 
dimensions that have emerged tend to be reliable, meaningful, and general across 
situations (Weiner, 1985, 1986). This is not to say that other dimensions are available, 
but the point is that the above factors appear to be parsimonious inasmuch as "there is 
a relative simplicity in the organization of causal thinking, just as there is in the 
selection of specific causes" (Weiner, 1985, p. 552). 
Stability, Locus, and Control: What is known so far? 
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First, I should mention that this thesis is concerned with the achievement 
domain, so I will limit the findings and focus specifically to academic success or 
failure. In particular, a number of studies reported that attributions to internal causes 
were more likely to occur following successful academic outcomes, whereas external 
causes are more likely to be called upon to explain academic failures (Bernstein, 
Stephan, & Davis, 1979; Frieze & Bar Tai, 1980; Kovenklioglu & Greenhaus, 1978; 
Watkins & Regmi, 1994). In these studies, internal attributions such as ability and 
effort were more likely to be endorsed by those who had done well ( or who imagined 
themselves or others doing well) on a course exam, whereas external attributions such 
as bad luck or test difficulty were more likely to be endorsed by those who had done 
poorly or failed ( or imagined themselves or others failing). 
Fmiher research investigating academic failure and success has yielded results 
that suggest stability, in addition to locus of control, constituted attributional structure. 
When students were asked to attribute causes to their actual performance on a college 
exam, perceived success (relative to perceived failure) was attributed to both internal 
and stable causes (Arkin & Maruyama, 1979). For example, success was attributed 
more often than failure to ability (an internal, stable cause), whereas failure was 
attributed more often to being in a bad mood (an internal, unstable cause) (Frieze, 
1976). Seemingly, stability is a more important attributional dimension than control in 
differentiating causes for success and failure. There is no doubt that a bias may exist 
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for attributing successful academic performances to internal and probably stable 
causes while attributing academic failures to external ( and perhaps unstable) causes. 
A possible explanation for the above pattern is a self-serving attributional bias 
that protects the self-esteem of the attributor. Implicit in this argument is the notion 
that individuals' causal attributional outcomes are mediated by positive and negative 
affect states produced by success and failure experiences (Weary, 1980; Weary & et 
al., 1982). As described by Weary, self-enhancing attributions (i.e., high self-
attributions) for success are mediated by and serve to maintain relatively high levels 
of positive affect and feelings of egotism, and self-protective attributions (i.e., low 
self-attributions following failure) are mediated by and function to alleviate high 
levels of negative affect, again to increase feelings of egotism; that is, self-protective 
attributions serve a threat-reducing purpose. In other words, individuals tend to take 
credit for good outcomes and deny blame for bad outcomes, hence enhancing or 
protecting their self-esteem. 
Gender differences have also been cited in studies focusing on learned 
helplessness and achievement-related failures. In earlier studies by Dweck, Goetz, and 
Strauss (1980), girls attribute failure to internal factors such as lack of ability, in 
contrast with boys who use external rationale, such as teacher variables. More recent 
studies, however, find no differences in causal attributions when investigating either 
achievement or depression (e.g., Cutler, 1996; Lee, 1999). 
Attributions predict future performance 
So far I have hinted that causal attributions explain why an outcome occurred. 
In addition, there is a bridge between causal attributions and future performance. For 
example, if a student were to attribute academic failure to their aptitude ( an internal, 
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stable, and perhaps uncontrollable cause), then there is not much of an expectancy that 
their future outcomes would result differently, thus influencing their motivation and 
performance ("If I failed because I am stupid, then what is the point of studying - I 
will only fail again"). On the other hand, if a student was to attribute such failure to 
their effort (an unstable, external, and controllable cause), then it could be expected 
that they would increase their effort if they wanted a better outcome on subsequent 
tests. 
Research in this area has yielded results that support the stability dimension of 
attributions as being central to assessing expected future outcomes (Kovenklioglu & 
Greenhaus, 1978; Weiner, 1985, 1986). In the main, among students who have 
succeeded on their tests, high ability (stable ascription) tended to correlate positively 
with both expected and actual performance, while good luck (unstable ascription) 
negatively correlated. Among those who experienced failure however, expected 
performance was inclined to positively relate to attributions to low effort (unstable 
ascription) and negatively relate to attributions to low ability (stable ascription). The 
sense is that, in principle, "changes in expectancy of success following an outcome 
are influenced by the perceived stability of the cause of the event" (Weiner, 1985, p. 
557). This principle has three corollaries: 
1. If the outcome of an event is ascribed to a stable cause, then that 
outcome will be anticipated with increased certainty, or with an 
increased expectancy, in the future. 
2. If the outcome of an event is ascribed to an unstable cause, then the 
certainty or expectancy of that outcome may be unchanged or the future 
may be anticipated to be different from the past. 
3. Outcomes ascribed to stable causes will be anticipated to be repeated in 
the future with a greater degree of certainty than are outcomes ascribed 
to unstable causes (Weiner, 1985, p. 559). 
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Attributions and motivation 
I have briefly highlighted that causal attributions influence expectancy of 
success. An attribution theory of motivation requires such a link, insofar as goal 
anticipations certainly affect other thoughts and actions, albeit they are not sufficient 
determinants of action (Weiner, 1985). In additional to expectancies, another class of 
variables with motivational impact are called goal incentives (from both cognitive and 
mechanistic conceptions of behaviour), or the properties of the goal object. 
"Motivation is believed to be determined by what one can get (incentive) as well as by 
the likelihood of getting it ( expectancy). This is the essence of the position of 
Expectancy X Value theorists" (Weiner, 1985, p. 559). 
Perceived causality (the reason why the goal was reached), however, does not 
influence the inherent properties or the objective value of the goal object. Despite the 
reasons for getting a dollar (hard work, luck, or a gift), it will always have the value of 
one dollar. Moving aside the objective value, instead, consider the subjective value of 
the goal - in terms of incentive value or consequences of goal attainment for the actor. 
One dollar is more preferable than 50 cents because it can buy twice as many lollies. 
Although causal ascriptions do not influence the objective properties of things, they 
do determine or guide emotional reactions, or the subjective consequences of gaol 
attainment (Weiner, 1985). For example, receiving a dollar from a friend as opposed 
to an enemy will have different affective consequences (Heider, 1958 cited in Weiner, 
1985). Or, finding a dollar on the ground may elicit surprise; being hit on the head 
with a dollar coin while playing soccer may produce anger; and a dollar received from 
friend in time of need may beget gratitude. These diverse affective reactions could 
generate quite disparate actions. For example, anger but not gratitude could lead to 
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reciprocal violent behaviour. The point is, causal ascriptions influence emotions, and 
that affective reactions play a role in motivated behaviour (Weiner, 1985). 
The Attribution-Emotion Process 
I am not attempting to provide an elaborate theory of emotion inasmuch as that 
would be a thesis in its own right and is not the present goal. Instead, I will highlight 
how attributions, according to Weiner, play a role in differentiating emotional quality 
and experience. 
Several converging theories point to the idea that cognitions of increasing 
complexity enter into the emotion process to further refine and differentiate 
experience (e.g., Arnold, 1970; Lazarus, 1966; 1982; Leventhal & Scherer, 1987; 
Oatley & Johnson Laird, 1987; Schachter & Singer, 1962). In keeping with 
attributional processes, Weiner contends that, following the outcome of an event, 
there is a general positive or negative reaction ( a "primitive emotion) based on the 
perceived success or failure of the outcome (the "primary appraisal"). Such primitive 
emotions may include happy for success, or frustrated or sad for failure, but 
importantly, are determined by the attainment or nonattainment of a desired goal - not 
by the cause of the outcome (these emotions are labelled outcome dependent-
attribution independent). 
With this distinction in mind, let us focus on the causal ascription, which for all 
intents and purpose will follow the outcome appraisal and the immediate affective 
reaction. As mentioned previously, the chosen (notwithstanding automatic processes) 
attribution(s) will generate a different set of emotions. For example, surprise is felt 
when success is perceived as a result of good luck, whereas calmness or serenity 
results from success that follows a long-term period of effort expenditure (these 
emotions are labelled attribution dependent)(Weiner, 1985). 
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To a very great extent, causal dimensions will additionally influence the 
emotional process. For example, the emotion of pride and feelings of self-esteem are 
linked with the locus dimension of causality; anger, gratitude, guilt, pity, and shame 
all are connected with the controllability dimension; and feelings of hopelessness 
(hopefulness) are associated with causal stability (see Weiner & Graham, 1985 for 
fuller discussion). Generally, external attributions for positive or negative outcomes 
do not influence feelings about the self, whereas internal attributions - whatever they 
may be - raise (successful outcomes) or lower (failure) self-esteem or self-worth 
(Weiner, 1985). "Hence, self-related emotions are influenced by the causal property 
oflocus, rather than by a specific cause per se" (Weiner, 1985, p. 561). 
Attributional style 
It seems reasonable that people develop attributional styles based on their past 
experience and learning; that is, explanations an individual makes for good and bad 
events would develop into a habitual pattern of thinking. In support of this position, 
research by Seligman and others suggests that explanatory style for negative events 
may persist across the life span and may constitute an enduring risk factor for 
depression, low achievement, and physical illness (Burns & Seligman, 1989; 
Peterson, Seligman, & Vaillant, 1988). In a broad sense, people can have either a 
positive or pessimistic explanatory style, whereby optimistic thinking is linked to 
good health and alternatively, pessimism can lead to an overall irrational thinking and 
low frustration tolerance (Peterson, 2000; Ziegler & Hawley, 2001). 
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The point is, when individuals consistently use the same type of attributions to 
explain a class of events in their lives, then it could be considered an attributional 
style (Marsh, 1984). The attribution style could be expected to influence an 
individual's cognitive appraisal of an event and the individual's choice of coping 
approaches. For example, if a student explains academic failure with an internal, 
stable, and perhaps uncontrollable attribution (e.g., aptitude), then, when faced with 
another academic challenge, it is likely, according to the previous discussion on 
expectancy, that s/he will see the situation as a further threat to his or her self-concept 
over which they have little control. They may believe that it is futile to deal with the 
problem directly thereby opting for an emotional coping-strategy; this would be, 
arguably, a poor fit between both objective reality and appraisal, and appraisal and 
copmg. 
Summary 
I have only discussed one type of attribution theory, namely Weiner's 
Attributional Theory of Achievement Motivation and Emotion. Even then, I only 
provided a brief insight, accentuating the dimensions that are underpinning his theory. 
These include, stability, locus, and controllability. When considering these 
dimensions in combination, predictable cognitive and behavioural consequences are 
further apparent. For negative outcomes, internal, stable, and uncontrollable 
attributions, such as a belief that exam failure is a result of poor ability (rather 
arbitrary as research suggests failure leads to external attributions), leads to 
decrements in self-esteem ( consequence of the Locus dimension), decreased 
expectancy of future success ( consequence of the Stability dimension) and feelings of 
pity and beliefs that nothing can be done ( consequence of the Controllability 
56 
dimension). Hence, subsequent action is likely to be restrained or feeble (consequence 
of all three dimensions). In essence, such an attributional style is pessimistic, thus it is 
not likely to motivate the individual and typically results in helplessness or poor 
health. 
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Stress, coping, and Causal Attributions 
Much of attribution theory evolved in the context of negative events. For 
example, theorists like Weiner have speculated how perceived causes for academic 
failure might explain an individual's reactions to such an event. These reactions could 
relate to negatively toned emotions or distress, an underlying facet of a stress 
response. In addition, the causal dimension controllability is pertinent to Wiener's 
attributional theory and has been mentioned as an important determinant of the stress 
response. Additionally, efficacy of coping could be linked to the expectancy for future 
success or failure, and the type and intensity of ensuing behaviour could be the coping 
strategy used in relation to a stressful outcome. Clearly, attributions, stress, and 
coping are all joined at the hip. 
It is easy to appreciate why stress researchers are interested in attributions. First, 
laboratory simulations (Wong & Weiner, 1981) and naturalistic studies of distressed 
populations (Taylor, et al., 1984) provide evidence that people spontaneously search 
for attributions in stressful circumstances. Moreover, achievement contexts have 
constantly proven attributions to be excellent predictors of subsequent affective and 
behavioral responses (Weiner, 1985, 1986). Last, cognitions such as control and self-
blame are constructs that are evident in both attributional and stress research ( e.g., 
Thompson & Spacapan, 1991). 
The Reformulated learned helplessness (RLH) theory (Abramson, Seligman, & 
Teasdale, 1978) proposes that it is locus, stability, and globality of an attribution that 
determines subsequent distress. Over the years, contradictory to the RLH theory, 
results have shown that controllability is a necessary construct when investigating 
pathology in both patient (Schiaffino & Revenson, 1992) and community populations 
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(Brown & Siegel, 1988). Moreover, in a recent study, classification of the attribution 
according to its controllability as well as locus and stability, not globality, proved 
essential when predicting either coping behaviour or states of distress (Amirkhan, 
1998). Consequently, the traditional dimensions oflocus, stability, and controllability 
(Weiner, 1985, 1986) are necessary for such studies intending to investigate the 
prediction of either coping or stress-related pathology (Amirkhan, 1998). 
Previous research 
The questions are, how are attributions applicable to stress research? Is the 
appropriate focus of attributions for the cause of the problem or for its solutions (see 
Brickman, Rabinowitz, Karuza, Coates, Cohn, & Kiddler, 1982)? In light of these 
questions, some subsequent studies verified the differential influences of attributions 
for events and attributions for solutions. For example, a study of Aids and Aid related 
complex (ARC) victims, found that attributing "possible improvement" versus 
attributing the illness to oneself had differential effects on distress, and a change in 
health-related behaviour was only associated with attributions for improvement 
(Moulton, Sweet, Temoshok, & Mandel, 1987). Likewise, a study of young and 
elderly adults found older people, compared to younger, preferred low-responsibility 
for both causes and solutions, however, only the latter ( creating a solution) was 
related to well-being for both the young and the old (Karuza, Zevon, Gleason, Karuza, 
& Nash, 1990). In an elderly sample, attributions for problems were differentiated 
from attributions for the management of problems and found the latter to be better 
predictors of coping (Aldwin & Revenson, 1987). 
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Coping or Distress? 
Seemingly, there is a relationship between some attributions and certain 
categories of coping behaviours. Although they have not been consistent, RLH studies 
support this relationship: Internal, stable, global attributions have been lin..ked to both 
problem directed coping (Follette & Jacobson, 1987) and more avoidant patterns of 
response (i.e., suppression and minimization) (Rim, 1990). On the other hand, studies 
incorporating the dimension of controllability have yielded more consistent results. 
Controllable, internal, and unstable causes for stressors have generally found to relate 
negatively to avoidant coping and positively to instrumental coping (Baumgardner, 
Heppner, & Arkin, 1986; Rodin, Bohm, & Wack, 1982). Amirkhan (1998) compared 
attributions for stressful events to attributions for coping failures and found the latter 
to be superior predictors of subsequent behaviour. Failures ascribed to internal, 
unstable, and controllable factors for example, produced active efforts to resolve the 
problem or rally social suppo1is, subsequently reducing subjective distress and stress-
related pathology. Avoidant and escapist responses, which aggravate distress and 
illness, were the result of failures attributed to external, stable, and uncontrollable 
forces. 
Noticeably, there is an indirect relationship between attributions and distress. 
For the most part, coping behaviours mediate the effect of attributions; direct 
relationships have been reported (e.g., Ostell & Divers, 1987; Amirkhan, 1998). 
However, attributions are generally better predictors of distress when pitted against 
coping responses (e.g., Bruder-Mattson & Hovanitz, 1990; Mikulincer, 1989). 
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The current study 
To date, the research has been concerned with attributions as predictors of 
stress-related pathology, not with psychological stress per se. Do a person's causal 
attributions also predict the levels of psychological stress in a demanding encounter? 
One may argue that this is an a priori; that is, if causal attributions relate to coping 
strategies, which are conducive to the appraisal of stress, then surely attributions 
predict the level of psychological stress. However, some coping strategies are 
differentiated by causal attributions, thus, the level of psychological stress that a 
person experiences may be determined, in part, by their causal attributions. For 
example, people tend to appraise an uncontrollable event as being more stressful than 
a controllable event, even if they do not actually do anything to affect it (Suls & 
Mullen, 1981a; Thompson, 1981). Therefore, I hypothesis that when a person is faced 
with a demand, their causal attributions will both influence the selection of coping 
strategy and the level of psychological stress that is experienced. Specifically, an 
external, stable, and uncontrollable causal attribution, due to its maladaptive tendency, 
should positively relate to stress, and negatively relate to social support, especially 
when one considers that internal, unstable, and controllable attributions produces 




Participants were recruited in a variety of university settings (i.e., Sitting on the 
steps outside the library, sitting on the grass, on benches and outside cafes). Potential 
participants were approached by myself and were asked if they would like to help 
with my thesis. There was no order as to how people were approached - I tried to 
keep the selection as random as possible. I also mentioned that they would receive a 
one-dollar Instant Kiwi ticket (giving them the chance to win $10,000) after 
completing a questionnaire, which should take no longer than 15 minutes of their 
time. By completing the questionnaire, it was understood by the participants that they 
consented to being subjects in my research thesis. 
The sample was slightly biased. There were more males (99) than females (90) 
(52.4% versus 47.6%) and ages ranged from 18 to 55 years (with a mean of24 ). 
Measures 
A questionnaire was used to obtain self-report responses from participants (see 
Appendix A). It contained four parts: (1) Age and gender; (2) Stress measure; (3) 
Causal attribution measure; and (4) Coping measure. The order of presentation of 
each measure was fixed and corresponded to assumed chronology of a stressful 
episode (i.e., stress response - causal attribution- coping). Because stress is 
considered contextual, I provided a stressful situation that was the same for all 
respondents. The situation was as follows: 
"Imagine that you have just received a grade for an important mid year exam 
for one of your major papers. Unfortunately, you have failed." 
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Attribution theory posits, for example, that the type of cause selected by the student to 
explain the failure would be the most powerful predictor of the likelihood of that 
student preparing for the final exam (coping strategy) (Weiner, 1985, 1986). 
Stress Measure 
To measure their perceptions of stress the following scales were used. 
How stressed would you be in this situation? 
Not at all stressed Extremely stressed 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
How anxious would you become in this situation? 
Not at all anxious Extremely anxious 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
How unpleasant would this situation be? 
Not at all unpleasant Extremely unpleasant 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
How frustrated would you be in this situation? 
Not at all frustrated Extremely frustrated 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
How much worry would this situation cause you? 
No worry at all Constant worry 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
How irritated would you be in this situation? 
Not at all irritated Extremely irritated 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
As expected, there was an internal consistency among the stress measures ( alpha = 
.91). As a result, the scores were summed to produce one composite stress measure, 
namely total stress. 
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Attribution Measure 
To typify the causes, the Causal Dimension Scale (CDS) (Russell, 1982) was 
used. This allowed respondents to themselves classify their attributions according to 
the dimensions of locus, stability, and controllability. The three-dimensional structure 
of the measure has been shown to have acceptable levels ofreliability (with an 
average Chronbach's alpha coefficient of .81). Both convergent and discriminant 
validity have been demonstrated for the measure (Russell, 1982). The following 
appeared on the questionnaire: 
Instructions: Think about the reason or reasons why you may have failed the midterm 
exam. The items below concern your impressions or opinions of the cause or causes 
of your failure. Circle one number for each of the following scales. 
1. Is the cause( s) something that: 
2. 
Reflects an aspect 
of yourself 
Is the cause( s): 
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
Reflects an aspect 
of the situation 
Controllable by 
you or other 
people 
Uncontrollable by 
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 you or other 
people 
3. Is the cause(s) something that is: 
Permanent 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Temporary 
4. Is the cause( s) something: 
Intended by you 
or other people 
9 8 7 
5. Is the cause(s) something that is: 
6 5 4 3 2 1 
Unintended by you 
or other people 
Outside of you 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Inside of you 
6. Is the cause(s) something that is: 
Variable over 
time 









5 6 7 
5 4 3 
8 9 
2 1 




8. Is the cause(s) something that is: 
Changeable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Unchanging 
9. Is the cause(s) something for which: 
No one is 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Someone is 
responsible responsible 
As suggested by Russel, a total score for each of the three subscales was arrived 
at by summing the responses to the individual items as follows: (1) locus of causality 
- Items 1, 5, 7; (2) stability- Items 3, 6, and 8; (3) controllability- Items 2,4, and 9. 
High scores on these subscales indicate that the cause is perceived as internal, stable, 
and controllable. 
Coping Measure 
To assess coping responses, an adapted version of the Revised Ways of Coping 
Checklist (RWCC) (Vitaliano, et al., 1985) was used (see below). This questionnaire 
reflects Lazarus and Folkman's theory of coping (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984a). 
Results obtained from factor analysis in several studies have demonstrated successful 
separation of the scales into Problem-focused and Emotion-focused coping (Folkman 
& Lazarus, 1985; Vitaliano, et al., 1985). Vitaliano, et al. (1985) reported that the 
internal consistency reliabilities ranged from .82 to .83 for two samples, and evidence 
for construct validity was provided by the finding that depression was positively 
related to the revised Wishful Thinking scale in three samples. In addition, a 
significant negative correlation was found between depression and the revised 
Problem-focused scales, which were both positively and negatively related to anxiety 
scores. Vitaliano, et al. (1985) also reported scores on the revised scales were not 
related to age, sex, education, and to marital status among two samples. 
Despite the fact that other theorists measures have been employed to assess 
attributions and coping (e.g., (Russell, 1982; Vitaliano, et al., 1985), it is envisaged 
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that factorial analysis will confirm whether such measures are reliable and valid. 
Although the individual items will remain the same, the broad factors in terms of 
coping styles (i.e., problem solving, blaming self, etc) could be expected to differ and 
may load differently to the original study because of the type of stressor that is used 
and the argument that coping relates to the stressor. If this were the case, then the 
coping styles should be expected, at least, to entail both emotion coping strategies and 
problem solving strategies, and notwithstanding the importance of social support, then 
this too may also be evident. Whatever styles or categories do result, these will be 
analysed to ascertain whether attributions may have any effect on their bearing. 
The following appeared on the questionnaire (minus the heading for each type 
of strategy) with 9 point likert scales (endpoints: extremely unlikely to extremely 
likely) assessing the respondent's belief as to the likelihood they would use a 
particular strategy (see the questionnaire in Appendix A): 
Using the scales below - based on your past experience, indicate which strategy(s) 
you would most likely adopt in order to help you cope with failing an exam. 
Problem Focused (did not appear on the questionnaire) 
I would bargain or compromise to get something positive from the situation. 
I would concentrate on something good that could come out of the whole thing. 
I would try not to bum my bridges behind me, but leave things open somewhat. 
I would change or grow as a person in a good way. 
I would make a plan of action and follow it. 
I would accept the next best thing to what I want. 
I would come out of this experience better than when I went in. 
I would try not to act too hastily or follow any hunch. 
I would change something so things would tum out all right. 
I would just take things one step at a time. 
I know what has to be done, so I would double my efforts and try harder to make 
things work. 
I would come up with a couple of different solutions to the problem. 
I would accept my strong feelings, but won't let them interfere with other things too 
much. 
I would change something about myself so I can deal with the situation better. 
I would stand my ground and fight for what I want. 
Seeks Social Support ( did not appear on the questionnaire) 
I would talk to someone to find out about the situation. 
I would accept sympathy and understanding from someone. 
I would get professional help and do what they recommend. 
I would talk to someone who can do something about the problem. 
I would ask someone I respect for advice and follow it. 
I would talk to someone about how I am feeling. 
Blamed Self ( did not appear on the questionnaire) 
I would blame myself. 
I would criticize or lecture myself. 
I would realize I brought the problem on myself. 
Wishful Thinking ( did not appear on the questionnaire) 
I would hope a miracle would happen. 
I would wish I was a stronger person - more optimistic and forceful. 
I would wish I could change what had happened. 
I would wish I could change the way that I felt. 
I would daydream or imagine a better time or place than the one I am in. 
I would fantasize or wish about how things might turn out. 
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I would think about fantastic or unreal things (like perfect revenge or finding a million 
dollars) that make me feel better. 
I would wish the situation would go away or somehow be finished. 
Avoidance (did not appear on the questionnaire) 
I would go on as if nothing has happened. 
I would feel bad that I can't avoid the problem. 
I would keep my feelings to myself. 
I would sleep more than usual. 
I would get mad at the people or things that cause the problem. 
I would try to forget the whole thing. 
I would try to make myself feel better by eating, drinking, smoking, taking 
medications. 
I would avoid being with people in general. 
I would keep others from knowing how bad things are. 
I would refuse to believe it had happened. 
The data were collated and entered into SPSS (a statistical program for the 
social sciences). Means and standard deviations are provided in Appendix 2. Factor 
analysis was the first port of call in order to establish whether the resulting factors or 
constructs were similar to the theorists who developed the questiom1aires. Once 
reliable factors were established, multiple regression was used to demonstrate, if any, 
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the relationship among the independent or predictor variables ( coping strategies and 
causal attributions) and the dependent variable (total stress). Further analysis tested to 
see if there was any difference in how males or females rated the different variables. 
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Results 
As expected, the factor analysis using Principle Component Analysis extracted 
3 coping styles that were distinct from the original measure, which had 5 coping 
styles. The Initial Eigenvalues for the factors were 7.2, 4.96 and 3.13 respectively, 
accounting for a cumulative variance of 36.41 %. Using a Varimax rotation method, 
items were loaded into 1 of the three styles with a cut-off of .4. The first coping style 
was made up of 12 items and was labelled Emotion Coping (Reliability Alpha .88). 
This measure consisted of items that stated for example, "I would fantasize or wish 
about how things might tum out," "I would get mad at the people or things that cause 
the problem," and "I would hope a miracle would happen." The second coping style 
was made up of 16 items and was labelled Problem Solving (Reliability Alpha .85). 
Some example items of this measure are "I would bargain or compromise to get 
something positive from the situation," "I would make a plan of action and follow it," 
and "I would change something so things would tum out all right." The last style 
consisted of 9 items and was labelled Seek Social Support (Reliability Alpha .75). 
This style consisted of, for example "I would ask someone I respect for advice and 
follow it," "I would talk to someone about how I am feeling," and "I would not keep 
my feelings to myself." 
In order to test the main hypothesis, a composite attribution score was formed 
from the Locus, Stability, and Controllability ratings, such that high scores indicated 
more external, stable, and uncontrollable attributions. Specifically, the controllability 
and locus factors were reversed to establish uncontrollability and extemality, and then 
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they were added to the stability factor, thus creating the maladaptive attribution. 1 
When this variable was paired with the stress measure, a significant and positive, 
albeit small relationship was yielded (.19, p<.05). In addition, as expected, there was a 
significant negative relationship produced when the maladaptive attribution score was 
paired with the coping strategy, seeking social support (-.16, p< .05). The hypothesis 
was confirmed in that those who perceived the causes of the exam failure to be 
external, stable, and uncontrollable were more likely to report high levels of stress and 
less likely to rally social supports. 
The coping strategies, as expected, generally related to the total stress reported. 
Table 1 shows the correlations between coping styles and total stress. In sum, all the 
three coping styles accounted for 17.6% of the variance in total stress. When using 
multiple regression, the standardized coefficients increased slightly from the reported 
correlations (Emotion coping to .361 and Social coping to .226, both p < .01). 
Although the causal sequence is not clear, the results suggest that as the stress levels 
increased, then the respondents were more likely to adopt both emotional coping and 
social support strategies. 
Table 1. Shows the correlations between the coping styles and total stress . 
Emotion Coping . 344** 
Problem Coping .035 
Seeking Social Support .225** 
**p <.01 one tailed. 
The causal dimension stability significantly correlated with both emotional 
coping and seeking social support. Table 2 shows the correlations between 
1 Three factor principle component factors were extracted for the attribution rating scales and rotated by 
Varimax procedures to simple structure. The factor structures of the scale corresponded to Russel's 
(1982) structure, although item 4 had to be reversed in order to establish internal reliability on the 
controllability subscale. 
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attributions and coping strategies. Stability correlated positively with emotional 
coping and negatively with seeking social support. This would suggest that as the 
respondents' considered the causes to be more stable, then they would require more of 
an emotional coping strategy, unlike those seeking social support, who would utilise 
this strategy if the causes appeared to be more unstable. 
Table 2. Shows the correlations between cawal attributions and the coping strategies. 
Emotional Problem Focused Seeking Social 
Coping Coping Support 
Locus of Causality .067 -.067 .12 
Stability .217** -.056 -.205** 
Controllability .083 -.118 .075 
**p <.01 .. 
Due to the significant findings with the stability causal attribution, further 
analysis investigated whether stability moderated the relationship between stress and 
any of the coping strategies. A median split was performed on the stability dimension, 
resulting in high stability and low stability (stable or unstable). When comparing the 
correlations between total stress and seeking social support for both the high (.09) and 
low (.41) stability groups, there was a significant difference in the correlations (p < 
.01). Notably, there is a positive and significant relationship between total stress and 
seeking social support for the low stability group, whereas the high stability group 
yielded a very small relationship. Figure 4 shows the relationship between total stress 
and seeking social support for both high and low stability. These findings show that 
the causal attribution stability moderated the relationship between total stress and 
seeking social support. This means that, as the causes were perceived to be less stable, 
seeking social support was a favourable option when stress levels were high, unlike 
those who ascribed more stable causes, whereby seeking social support seemed a less 
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Figure 4. Shows the relationship between total stress and seeking social support for 
both high and low stability. 
There were significant gender effects. Women on average, responded that they 
would be more stressed than males, t(186) = 2.06, p<.05), that they would be more 
likely to seek social support, t(186) = 2.95, p<.01, and that they would be more likely 
to adopt a problem coping strategy t(186) = 2.194, p<.05.The effect sizes of each of 
the differences are small, thus indicating weak power. Although it is not significant at 
the alpha level of .05, females reported the causes to be less stable, t(l86) = 1.884, 
p=06 l. Table 3 shows the male and female means, confidence intervals, and standard 
deviations for each of the variables measured. 
In general, the causal attributions related to the total stress reported. Table 4 
shows the correlations between causal attributions and total stress. Further regression 
analysis was performed to disentangle the influences of the correlated predictors or 
causal attributions. The analysis pitted the attribution scores against each other by 
simultaneously entering them into regression analysis and then removing each 
predictor to ascertain unique variance and coefficient scores. Table 5 shows the 
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standardised coefficients for total stress and each causal attribution. Regression 
analysis yielded results demonstrating that some co-variation was evident in the first 
reported correlations; that is, the relationships between total stress and causal 
attributions reduced and/or were not significant. When analysing the variables 
individually, stability accounted for the most variance (2.4%), locus of causality 
(LOC) was almost as high (2%), and control did not even account for 1 % of the 
variance in the stress reported. In sum, control, stability, and locus of LOC accounted 
for 5.3 % of the variance in the reported stress. From these results, it is evident that 
the coping styles had more influence on the reported stress levels than did the causal 
attributions. 
Table 3. Male and female's descriptive variables for their stress, attribution, and 
coping scores. 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Variable Gender Mean Std. Dev. Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Total Male 42.30 6.75 40.96 43.65 
Stress* Female 44.40 7.23 42.88 45.93 
LOC 
Male 18.17 4.37 17.30 19.04 
Female 18.24 4.17 17.36 19.11 
Stability 
Male 10.56 3.94 9.77 11.34 
Female 9.52 3.58 8.76 10.27 
Control 
Male 12.79 3.031 12.18 13.39 
Female 13.31 2.661 12.75 13.88 
Emotional Male 64.67 19.90 60.70 68.64 
Coping Female 67.60 18.37 63.73 71.47 
Problem Male 92.92 18.56 89.22 96.62 
Coping* Female 98.62 16.87 95.06 102.17 
Social Male 51.03 11.60 48.72 53.34 
Support Female 56.04 11.71 53.58 58.51 
Note: * = p<.05. 
Table 4. Shows the correlations between c~al attributions and total stress. 
Locus of Causality (LOC) -.142* 
Stability .154* 
Controllability .08 
* p <.05 one tailed. 
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Table 5. Shows the causal attribution's and total stress standardized coefficients when 
simultaneously entered into regression analysis. 











The above results, which are considered rather poor in any sense, are not 
surprising when each attribution score was tested for internal reliability. The highest 
reliability alpha was yielded by LOC (Alpha= .78), then stability (Alpha= .57), and 
disappointingly, control succumbed a very small alpha (Alpha= .37). Notably, this 
last alpha was only obtained when scores had been reversed. In the first instance, 
corrected item total correlations demonstrated that some respondents had answered in 
reverse order on the likert scales. For example, question 9 of the attribution scale 
asked "Is the cause(s) something for which: no one is responsible or someone is 
responsible" produced a negative correlation as compared to its counterpart question 
2, which produced a positive correlation when asking if the cause was controllable or 
not. Notably, the scale from the former question went from 1 to 9 on the likert scale, 
unlike the latter question mentioned, which went from 9 to 1 ( see Appendix 1 for a 
copy of the questionnaire). 
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Discussion 
The hypothesis, which stated that respondents' external, stable, and 
uncontrollable attributions would positively relate to the respondents' psychological 
stress level and negatively relate to seeking social support, was supported. Despite the 
small correlations, their directions nevertheless reinforce the idea that when failing an 
exam, perceptions of causes that are more inclined to include the composite of: ( 1) an 
external locus; (2) an uncontrollable tendency; and (3) are stable or likely to occur 
time and time again, relate to higher levels of psychological stress. Moreover, in 
response to the stress, coping is less likely to involve the rallying of social support. 
Implicit in the findings are coping measures that are unlike previous research, 
which too utilised the Revised Ways of Coping Checklist (RWCC) (Vitaliano, et al., 
1985). This research for example, resulted in three coping strategies, which were 
suitable labelled Problem Focused, Emotion Focused, and Seeking Social Support. 
When pairing these coping strategies against stress, as expected the variability in the 
reported stress is at least partially a function of peoples' coping. Specifically, there 
was a positive relationship between the stress level and both Seeking Social Support 
(.23) and Emotion Coping (.34). Whether an increase in reported stress meant that 
respondents were more likely to seek social support and adopt emotional coping, or 
utilising these coping strategies meant an increase in stress, is not clear from the 
relationship. When one considers the question that was asked however, namely "how 
would you cope with failing the exam" and the order in which the questions were 
asked, it is reasonable to assume that the coping strategies would be employed in 
response to the stress, thus suggesting that the stress resulting from failing an exam 
would likely lead to more emotion focused and social support strategies. 
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The relationship between coping and attributions was not as successful 
however. Only small significant correlations were reported between the causal 
dimension stability and both the coping strategies - emotion coping (.22) and seeking 
social support (-.21). This would suggest that as the causes of the stress were 
considered more stable, then more of an emotional coping strategy would be utilised, 
and for the social support, then this is more likely to be sought if the causes are 
considered less stable. In fact, this last relationship is strengthened by the results that 
found the causal attribution stability to moderate the relationship between total stress 
and seeking social support In other words, those who considered the causes to be less 
stable were more likely to seek social support if the stress was high than those who 
reported the causes to be more stable. Therefore, if the causes of the heightened stress 
appear to be unpredictable (unstable), then it would seem likely that seeking social 
support is a favourable coping strategy, especially when the stressor is the failure of 
an exam. 
Although this research was not concerned with gender differences, some 
interesting differences have been found. First, females believed that they would feel 
more stressed than the males when failing an exam. Second, females more than males 
believed that they would adopt more of a problem solving strategy and were more 
likely to seek social support if they had to cope with failing an exam. Last, although 
not significant at the alpha level of .05, females believed the causes to be less stable 
than the males. These findings will be discussed in more detail later in the chapter. 
Generally, the attributions unexpectedly accounted for a small percentage in the 
reported stress variability (5%). Locus of causality produced a negative, albeit small 
relationship with stress (-.14). Stability (.15) and controllability (.08) generated small 
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positive correlations. Multiple regression analysis, which accounts for the variability 
produced from other variables, modified the correlations and resulted in insignificant 
findings at the alpha value of .05. It was expected, that the controllability should at 
least account for some significant variance in the stress reported due to previous 
research that infallibly linked stress to controllability (e.g., Compas, et al., 1988a; 
Forsythe & Compas, 1987; Krohne, 1986; Miller, 1979b; Suls & Mullen, 1981a, 
1981b). 
The poor findings could be attributed to the fact that the measure was not 
internally reliable. Using reliability analysis, in the first instance the control measure 
produced a negative correlation. Factorial analysis demonstrated that question 9 
resulted in a negative correlation with its pairs, suggesting that in the main, 
respondents had answered this question in reverse. When the item scores were 
reversed, reliability analysis produced a positive, stronger reliability coefficient, 
notwithstanding that it was still small (.3 when .7 is considered respectable). This 
result seemed odd when one considers that an average Chronbach's alpha coefficient 
of .81 has been reported from other analytic investigations (Amirkhan, 1998). 
Nevertheless, Russel (1982) makes note that "a variety of other factors may influence 
responses to the Causal Dimension Scale in actual achievement settings, which could 
adversely affect the validity of the measure" (p. 1143). What these factors could be 
has yet to be established. 
General Discussion 
The Present Research 
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This research was concerned with causal attributions and their relationship with 
both psychological stress and the coping strategies in response to such stress. This 
type of research is not completely novel in that previous investigations have revealed 
a causal sequence in which attributions affected distress both directly and by 
influencing the choice of coping strategy (Amirkhan, 1998). The aim of this study was 
not to replicate this link between attributions and distress, but to ascertain if 
attributions were in the first instance, related to psychological stress or in other words, 
influencing the perceived threat of an ostensibly stressful situation. In addition, do 
these attributions effect how coping will be utilised in response to the threat? Indeed, 
the results confirm that the perception of threat is increased when a stressor is 
appraised as having been caused by uncontrollable, stable, and external factors. That 
is, a positive, albeit small correlation demonstrated that psychological stress increases 
when such a maladaptive causal attribution is cognised. Moreover, this inhibits the 
utilisation of seeking social support in response to the threat, demonstrated by a 
negative correlation that was also yielded. 
Despite the significant results that were obtained for the above results, both 
stress and seeking social support yielded small correlations with the maladaptive 
causal attribution (.19 and -.16 respectively, p<.05). One possible reason for small 
correlations is the reliability of the attribution measure; that is, as previously 
mentioned controllability produced poor internal reliability results thus additionally 
questioning its validity. Although, 3 factor principle analysis produced 3 simple 
factors that corresponded to Russell's results, hence suggesting that the measures 
were perhaps valid. The point is, the correlations were small, but the directions and 
their significance demonstrates the likelihood that appraisals involving causal 
ascriptions of a certain characteristic are contributing to the outcome of a stressful 
situation - such as failing an exam. 
The results that were obtained involved a re-factoring of the coping measure. 
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The RWCC coping measure originally had 5 factors, problem solving, seeking social 
support, wishful thinking, blaming the self, and avoidance, which were invalid in this 
study as only 3 factors were produced from factorial analysis. As expected, the three 
factors were problem solving, emotion focused coping, and seeking social support. 
When analysing the items that made up seeking social support, it is evident that they 
too relate to emotion-focused coping. That is, respondents believed they would seek 
others help for emotional or sympathetic reasons as opposed to asking for help to 
change the environment. The problem solving strategy was not necessarily 
characterised by items that exercise action to alter or change the immediate outcome, 
but possibly lead to actions that would alter or change future examination attempts, 
for example, "I would make a plan of action and follow it." 
The above findings demonstrate the validity of the contextual model insofar as 
they emphasise the point that coping is best defined in relation to the situation. There 
is no doubt that people have preferred ways of dealing with situations, and this 
research does not disprove such an idea. In fact, by asking people how they would or 
should cope, as was the case in the present research, one may then argue that I have 
only governed respondents' coping style, not what they would actually do in response 
to a specific stressor. I am not disputing such an argument, but the context will 
characterise the most applicable coping strategy, notwithstanding the people 
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appraisals that will add variation in any applicable strategies. Such variation in coping 
is partly accounted for by the causal attributions that people make; in particular, the 
findings suggest that causal stability was a significant predictor of both emotion-
focused coping and support seeking. 
Previous research has demonstrated that attributions are better predictors of 
solutions for the management of the problem as opposed to the problem itself. 
Basically, the "problem" in this research was the failure of an exam and the 
attributions proved generally to be better predictors of coping with the problem than 
the level of psychological stress resulting from the problem. This is demonstrated by 
the findings that show a significant relationship between attributions and coping and 
an insignificant relationship between the attributions and stress. 
The significant relationship consists of the causal dimension stability negatively 
correlating with seeking social support, which suggests that the respondents would 
seek social support if the causes of the exam failure were considered to be less stable. 
When considering previous research that demonstrates failures are typically ascribed 
as unstable ( e.g., effort) and active efforts to resolve or manage the problem are more 
likely to follow when the cause of the problem is considered unstable (Kovenklioglu 
& Greenhaus, 1978; Weiner, 1985, 1986), then it is not surprising that an instrumental 
coping strategy like seeking social support would be utilised. One reason is that, an 
unstable attribution like effort enables the attributor to protect their ego or self-esteem, 
thus enabling them to approach others with a good sense of self, which for all intents 
and purpose is unlikely to happen if one considers themselves to have low aptitude 
(stable attribution). 
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Further support is demonstrated in the current findings whereby the causal 
attribution 'stability' moderated the relationship between stress and seeking social 
support. First, the stress from failing an exam is negative affect due to the non-
attainment of a goal. In line with Weary's (1980) theory, self-protective attributions 
function to alleviate high levels of negative affect to increase feelings of egotism or 
serve a threat-reducing purpose. Unstable attributions for example, are able to reduce 
negative affect because again, they relate to effort and not the person's aptitude. This 
defensive mechanism increases the likelihood that social support will be sought when 
stress is high. In other words, it is possible that respondents' who made unstable 
attributions believed they could ask for help when stressed because they could explain 
their failure as being a result of effort and not aptitude, thus not seeing the situation as 
a further threat to his or her self-concept. 
Overall, the coping strategies have won the day by demonstrating their 
superiority in predicting stress levels when pitted against attributions. Basically, the 
variation in the reported stress was better predicted by the coping strategies than the 
causal attributions. There was a positive relationship between stress and both 
emotion-focused coping and seeking social support. Specifically, the emotional 
coping strategy consisted of items that related to wishful thinking. For example, "I 
would fantasize or wish about how things might tum out," "I would get mad at the 
people or things that cause the problem," and "I would hope a miracle would happen." 
Given that the stressful situation was the failure of an exam, it is therefore not 
surprising that respondents believed they would fantasise or wish for a different 
outcome because an important goal had been thwarted. With regards to seeking social 
support, this measure also consisted of items that relate to emotional regulation. For 
example, "I would talk to someone about how I am feeling," and "I would not keep 
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my feelings to myself." On the one hand, emotional regulation seemed to be 
underpinning how respondents believed they would cope with the exam failure or the 
outcome, whether this meant fantasising about a different outcome or seeking 
sympathy. On the other hand, findings also yielded a problem solving strategy and 
though it did not correlate with the reported stress level, it nevertheless focused on 
reducing the recurrence of the outcome or future stress. For example, "I would make a 
plan of action and follow it," and "I would change something so things would tum out 
all right" are items that lead to a possibly different outcome when the respondent 
participates in future exams. 
The question then becomes, is this type of coping response considered 
effective? When considering the fact that students were asked how they would cope 
with the exam failure, which for all intents and purpose is an immediate response to 
the stressor, an emotional coping strategy would seem more appropriate than an 
immediate problem solving strategy because the situation is not amenable to change -
the student failed the exam (past tense) and there is no changing this outcome. This is 
not true for future occurrences however, so taking some action to reduce the 
likelihood of future reoccurrences seems wise; applying some volition or control over 
the situation may be fitting in this sense. Seemingly, the respondents in this research 
generally have a good fit between situational appraisals of changeability and actual 
coping processes due to the type and utilisation of both emotion-focused strategies 
and problem focused strategies, thus suggesting an increase in the possibility for the 
management or reduction of distress. Overall, the resulting taxonomy highlights the 
important idea that when faced with stress, both instrumental and palliative strategies 
operate in unison to facilitate adaptation. 
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So far, the main hypothesis that expected the attributions to relate to both stress 
and the coping strategies has been elaborated. For instance, the specific hypothesis 
that predicted a maladaptive causal attribution to positively relate to stress and 
negatively relate to seeking social support was supported. Implicit in these findings is 
the fact that the maladaptive attribution is characterised by a stable attribution and 
results demonstrate that this causal dimension negatively correlates with seeking 
social support; that is, stable ascriptions for failure inhibit the seeking of social 
support. This may be so because failures attributed to stable ascriptions are 
characterised as ego threatening, thus reducing any participation in situations that are 
conducive to decreasing self-esteem ( e.g., social interaction). On the other hand, the 
individual attributions were poor predictors of the stress level, so clarifying which 
dimension is conducive to increased stress is difficult, although previous research 
pinpoints the uncontrollable dimension as increasing stress levels. Therefore, when 
explicating the individual attributions' predictive significance, results show they are 
greater predictors of how a person will manage or cope with the stress as opposed to 
the actual level of psychological stress. 
In fact, the coping strategies were better at predicting the stress level than the 
attributions. This is not surprising when one considers that coping relates to stress and 
its primary function is to manage or reduce stress. Whether the coping strategies 
employed by the respondents are in fact palliative in this type of situation has not been 
investigated in this study. If this was to be done, then temporal considerations would 
have to be considered because not only would the coping change as the situation 
unfolded, but new demands may ensue more stress ( e.g., the availability of social 
support). 
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What is interesting nevertheless, is the fact that the coping strategies are 
contextual or have been defined by the stressor. For the most part, this supports 
Folkman and Lazarus's cognitive-relational model that emphasises the cognitive and 
behavioural efforts that change in order to manage specific demands (Lazarus & 
Folkman, 1984). The specific demand in this case was the failure of the exam and the 
factorial analysis that was performed on the coping measure used in response to this 
demand shows that the simple coping structures were different to what the original 
measure expected. This is not to say that the original measure is invalid or unreliable, 
but what is pertinent to research investigating coping is the fact that the specific 
demand or the context will be a considerable influence on the resulting coping 
structures or characteristics. 
I say a "considerable influence" because obviously people appraisals and 
biological factors are concomitant with the context. For example, the findings show 
that the sex or the gender of the respondent influenced the stress level, the stable 
ascriptions, and the amount of problem-focused coping that would be utilised. These 
gender differences were not hypothesised, so next I will discuss why these gender 
effects may have been yielded. 
Gender and Stress 
First, females reported that they would be significantly more stressed than their 
male counterparts. Barnett, Biener, & Baruch, (1987) are the editors of a book that 
attempts to unearth the reasons why women report more stress and stress related 
symptoms than do men. For example, one chapter looks at the different roles that 
males and females adopt because of the idea that women are, perhaps the more 
emotional gender of the two. In essence, this is the social expectation; women are 
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more caring, emotional and are obligated to respond to the needs of others (Lueptow, 
Garovich Szabo, & Lueptow, 2001; Wethington, McLeod, & Kessler, 1987). In other 
words, females are significantly more affected emotionally by life events and such 
vulnerability accounts for the relationship between gender (females) and 
psychological distress (Kessler, 1979). For example, in one study that measured self-
esteem, results show that adolescent women were more concerned with body image 
and were more influenced by media than their male counterparts, and not to mention 
that there was a significant difference in emotional expression, with boys becoming 
more restrictive across adolescence (Polee Lynch, Myers, Kliewer, & Kilmartin, 
2001). 
Considering the fact that more women are entering the work force, it could be 
expected that they have as many, if not more demands to cope with than their male 
counterparts. Traditionally, wives were more inclined to appease their husbands, 
beckoning to every need and sufficing their conjugal expectations. Given that in such 
circumstances, the husband was the proverbial "bread winner," a certain amount of 
control underlined this marital role, which meant that males were less stressed than 
their wives (Barnett & Baruch, 1987). Moreover, as females adopted more non-
traditional roles, their depression levels dropped, presumably from the relative gain in 
power. Although this shift in the balance of control may provide strain on the father 
or husband role due to their loss of power, females may also find this taxing because 
their well being has been more closely related to the quality of their marital role 
(Barnett & Baruch, 1987). However, despite these social changes that may govern the 
family politics, sex typing has not followed suit whereby there are "still gendered 
differences based on genetic patterns evolved from adaptations to differing 
reproductive challenges of early males and females" (Lueptow, et al., 2001, p.1 ). In 
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other words, males and females have to cope with demands that are distinguished by 
their genetic makeup and for women, this means coping with more changes in 
adolescence than what males have to endure. 
Are women more emotional than men? The popular belief is that, indeed, 
women are described as more emotional than men. When social context is 
disregarded, and emotionality is defined as a global disposition that is stable over 
time, then women consistently describe themselves as more emotional than do men 
(Barrett, Robin, Pietromonaco, & Eyssell, 1998). It is noted however, that the problem 
with retrospective descriptions is the reconstructive process that is used to recall such 
information. Broadly speaking, recollections are inaccurate because heuristics, 
cognitive structures, implicit theories, and motivations may bias memories of past 
events. For example, when recalling their experiences, men might think, "I am a man, 
and men are not emotional, therefore I must not be emotional", whereas women might 
think, "I am a women, and women are emotional, therefore I must be emotional". 
Although women describe themselves as more emotional than their male counterparts 
when retrospective global ratings are used, momentary ratings have failed to show the 
same sex differences (Barrett, et al., 1998). 
Overall, the above findings point to the idea that social expectation brings forth 
for females a susceptibility to report more emotion, which may account for the 
differences in reported stress. Notably, this research used self-report measures that 
asked respondents to rate their beliefs as to how much stress they would feel and 
indeed, women could have rated higher because they are susceptible to reporting more 
emotion, whereas the males may have been more restrictive in their reports. Had this 
research used momentary measures that focused on participants' arousal levels, 
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maybe then the differences could have been reduced. On the other hand, due to 
females having a 'vulnerability' to feel more emotion, then this psychological 
precursor may in tum lead to physiological affect thereby influencing their arousal 
levels. Or, perhaps females' biology and the changes that occur in adolescence are 
affecting their arousal level, which then leads to psychological affect. Better yet, it is 
not sensible to distinguish such factors or make inferences as to which factor is 
preceding any affect but to realise that all factors are interrelated and not mutually 
exclusive. 
Gender and coping 
Given the fact that women are stereotyped as the more caring and emotional of 
the two sexes, it is therefore not surprising to find that women provide more frequent 
and more effective social support than do men (Bell, 1987). However, despite their 
empathetic nature, women are predisposing themselves to the "contagion of stress that 
is felt when troubling life events afflict those to whom they are emotionally close" (p. 
267). Moreover, Sherman and Walls, (1995) found that social support is a potent 
variable for females in perception of both stress and symptoms but essentially 
unrelated for males. Likewise, Ptacek, Smith, & Dodge, (1994) found that women 
reported seeking social support and using emotion-focused coping to a greater extent 
than men, whereas men reported using relatively more problem-focused coping than 
women. The findings from this current thesis also demonstrate that women more than 
men, are more likely to seek social support when coping with a stressor such as failing 
an exam. Unlike any other research though, women reported that they would utilise 
more of a problem-focused strategy than men would. 
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In other words, females were more likely than males to make a plan of action 
and change something so things would eventually turn out all right. In addition, the 
results show that females were more likely to make unstable ascriptions as to the 
cause of the exam failure, whereas the males were more likely to make a stable causal 
attribution (the difference here between the males and females was significant at the p 
= .61). It could be argued that the females believed more than males that they could 
take control of the likelihood of future occurrences of the outcome, thus 
demonstrating that they are not as helpless as the males may appear to be. In fact, 
other research in the academic arena has clearly found that boys showed more 
helpless behaviour as assessed by the teacher, than did girls, while on the other hand 
girls reported more psychological maladjustment (Valas, 2001 ). Another study that 
investigated mathematical problem-solving behaviour, found that girls had higher 
persistence than did boys during applied problem solving (Vermeer, Boekaerts, & 
Seegers, 2000). Meece and Courtney, (1992) examined sex differences in 
achievement perceptions with emphasis on mathematics and postulate that sex 
differences result in part from students' expectations of success and the perceived 
incentive value of the task. More recent research found that girls outperformed boys 
on the Planning and Attention scales of the Cognitive Assessment System (Naglieri & 
Rojahn, 2001). And closer to home, Fergusson and Horwood (1997) in a longitudinal 
study found: (1) males achieved less well than females; (2) differences in educational 
achievement could not be explained by gender differences in intelligence since boys 
and girls had very similar IQ test scores; and (3) the higher rate of educational under-
achievement in males could be explained by gender related differences in classroom 
behaviors with males being more prone to disruptive and inattentive classroom 
behaviors that appeared to impede male learning. It is concluded that the traditional 
educational disadvantage shown by females has largely disappeared and has been 
replaced by an emerging male disadvantage. 
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In light of these findings, it could be expected that females will indeed be more 
attentive to future achievement outcomes, especially when coping with failing an 
exam. While acknowledging that failure is more likely to elicit causal attributions, the 
causal ascriptions were more unstable for females than males, thereby reducing any 
expectation for females that such a failure will happen again. So, with females being 
more attentive and believing they could expect a different outcome, problem-focused 
coping strategies pertaining to planning and changing future outcomes is not only 
efficacious, but is objectively a fitting response to failing an exam for those who want 
educational achievement. This is not always adaptive however, as over expending 
energy can lead to more distress when efforts result in futility, and can result with 
psychological maladjustment. 
There appears to be a fine line between adaptive and maladaptive coping 
strategies. What distinguishes the two is whether one exerts effort and how much 
effort is exerted to alter the situation when it is amenable to change. This relates to the 
following saying by an anonymous author: 
God grant us the courage to change the things that need 
changing, the serenity to accept the things we cannot change, and 
the wisdom to know the difference. 
The above statement implies that both problem-focused strategies (change the things 
that need changing) and emotion-focused strategies (serenity to accept the things we 
cannot change) are available. The wisdom is being able to use them effectively. 
If a person is stressed, then his or her coping strategies are ineffective. 
Ineffective coping in the contextual model, relates to a poor fit between a person's 
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appraisals of the demand and/or available resources to meet the demand. As this 
research points out though, the appraisal process is complex and is characterised by a 
myriad of factors that are precipitating any felt stress, for example, the causal 
attributions of the stressor. As a result, a good fit between the demands and one's 
appraisal's requires a sense of emotional intelligence - an awareness of one's 
thoughts, feelings, and physical and behavioural reactions and exerting appropriate 
control over them. "The component coper is no more able than the deficient one to 
completely avoid potentially stressful situation, but his [sic] mental preparedness for 
the possibility, his differentiated appraisal of events (internal and external) and his 
broad repertoire of coping techniques allow him to respond in a manner that 
maximizes impact and minimises strain" (Roskies, 1983, p. 277). 
Shortcomings of this Research 
When adopting others' measures for research, there are certain assumptions that 
must be made. That is, one may expect that, based on previous research, the measure 
is both reliable and valid. Implicit in this expectation is the idea that published 
measures will not require any alteration. And rightly so, such published measures 
advertise their internal consistency and validity, explicating the notion that over 
various platforms the results support their hypotheses thereby confirming their simple 
dimensional structures. It is not until numerous hours have been spent and the actual 
data are collected, that the bewildered researcher realises that the measures contravene 
some assumptions; that is, once analysed, the measures are in fact unreliable. This is 
not always the case however, but certainly is a shortcoming of this research. For 
example, Russell's Causal Dimension Scale yielded a poor internal reliability on the 
controllability dimension. Only after reversing some of the items, did a positive and 
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more reliable alpha result. Any future research that utilises this measure would be 
advised to have the individual items rated in a consistent fashion ( e.g., from 1 to 9 for 
all items) so that the less observant participant does not inadvertently score opposite 
to their implicit intentions - although, this may lead to a response bias. Alternatively, 
each dimension may need to have its items listed in the same direction, with a switch 
between one of the dimensions (e.g., all the controllability items listed from 1 to 9 and 
the stability and locus items listed from 9 to 1 ). Albeit, a mixture of both methods 
would demonstrate if a concern with the items does indeed exist. 
Another possible shortcoming is in the design. A questionnaire was used to 
obtain participants' attitudes as to how they believed they would respond to a specific 
stressor. Attitudes and behaviour are predictably related in that attitudes influence 
action, though the relationship is not a perfect correlation. That is, a person may say 
one thing, and yet do another. On the other hand, actions influence attitude; that is, 
given the right conditions, a person's actions can change their attitude, thus bringing 
their attitude into line with their actions ( e.g., cognitive dissonance theory). The point 
is, by asking participants to self-report, there is a possibility that they will show an 
experimental bias, thus not answering veridically, but in a fashion that they believe 
will produce the desired effect. 
Possibilities for Future Research 
Where to from here? Perhaps further research could use the current 
questionnaire with minimal alterations (taking into account the above comments on 
the causal attribution measure) and recruit participants on the basis that they have 
failed or performed poorly on exams or assignments. Such research could investigate 
retrospective accounts of behaviour and compare if they do indeed reflect attitudes. 
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Each respondents' Grade Point Average could additionally provide an objective 
measure of performance and the inclusion of an "after affect" measure (i.e., how each 
person felt after they had coped with failing an exam) would see how well 
respondents actually coped; that is, if their distress was reduced as a result of their 
coping. The present research however, did not measure emotion because if you asked 
someone how they believed they would feel after they coped, it would seem that a 
respondent would be ostensibly biased; common sense would have it that it would be 
atypical for a person to rate a coping strategy that they believed was ineffective. The 
"after affect" measure, may relate both directly and indirectly to the causal 
attributions (Amirkhan, 1998). This research found that a particular belief pattern 
inhibited certain coping strategies that may be considered apt in the face of adversity 
like failing an exam. If future research determined that there are some retrospective 
reports of troubling behaviours, like pessimistic causal attributions, which are 
undermining coping and future outcomes, then such research could reinforce the idea 
that there is a pattern of thinking that is maladaptive in response to setbacks like 
failing an exam. 
Concluding Comments 
This research used self-report to determine how subjects in the context of a 
particular stressful encounter, believed they would appraise a stressor with regards to 
its threat, its causes, and what coping strategies they would utilise in response. As 
Folkman & Lazarus (1985) point out, the problem is not that self-report is not as 
effective as other methods of inquiry - in fact, for certain kinds of psychological 
processes it may be the only way to obtain certain information - but rather that it 
eventually requires verification by other methods such as observation of direct 
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behaviour and physiological assessment. In saying that, this research was only 
concerned with participants' beliefs because as Lazarus has repeatedly emphasised, 
stress lies in the eye of the beholder as much in the external event itself; it is the 
individual's evaluation of the demands of a given situation as well as of the resources 
available to meet these demands that determines whether the situation will call forth a 
stress response (Lazarus, 1966). In this instance, asking people how they appraise a 
potentially stressful situation brings to light the mental processes that are undermining 
peoples' adaptive functioning and exemplifies that thinking is influencing a person's 
well-being. 
Finally, the results of this study support the importance of the contextual 
definition of coping in response to stress. Each stressful encounter will call forth its 
own particular coping responses, thus suggesting that people are better equipped when 
they have a repertoire of coping resources to combat stress. It could be expected that 
when faced with an alternative stressor, then a different set of coping structures would 
result, notwithstanding the causal attributions that too may be different. Considering 
that it has been shown that very negative and unexpected failures are those most likely 
to elicit attributional searches (Wong & Weiner, 1981), then there is no certainty that 
cognitive structures during the stress process will necessarily contain attributional 
schemas. Therefore, it is noteworthy to point out that the context - this being the 
interaction between the individual and the environment will ultimately determine both 
the covert and overt behaviours. The final word is though, that the person brings to 
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Appendix A. 
Questionnaire for Jay Mc/ean's Thesis Project 
Welcome and thankyou for participating in my Masters in Arts thesis project. The University of 
Canterbury ethics committee has approved this research. Please be aware, nevertheless, that your name or 
any other details that lead to your identification are not required - you will remain completely anonymous. 
In addition, you are under no obligation to participate; your involvement is voluntary. However, by 
completing this questionnaire, it is understood that you consent to the following information to be used 
for the purpose that is intended, namely for my MA research. 
Part I 
1. What is your age in years? ------------------------------------------------------------------------------• 
2. What is your gender, male (M) or female (F)? ------------------------------------------------------• 
Part II 
Instructions: Imagine that you have just received a grade for an important mid year exam 
for one of your major papers. Unfortunately, you have failed. The items below concern the 
level of stress that may result from such a situation. Circle one number for each of the 
following scales. 
1. How stressed would you be in this situation? 
Not at all stressed 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Extremely stressed 
2. How anxious would you become in this situation? 
Not at all anxious 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Extremely anxious 
3. How unpleasant would this situation be? 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Extremely 
unpleasant unpleasant 
4. How frustrated would you be in this situation? 
Not at all frnstrated 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Extremely 
frustrated 
5. How much worry would this situation cause you? 
No worry at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Extreme worry 
6. How irritated would you be in this situation? 
Not at all irritated 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Extremely irritated 
Part III 
Instructions: Think about the reason or reasons why you may have failed the exam. The 
items below concern your impressions or opinions of the cause or causes of your failure. 
Circle one number for each of the following scales. 
1. Is the cause( s) something that: 
Reflects an aspect of 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Reflects an aspect of 
yourself the situation 
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2. Is the cause(s): 
Controllable by you 9 
or other people 
8 
3. Is the cause(s) something that is: 
Permanent 9 8 
4. Is the cause(s) something: 
Intended by you or 
other people 9 8 
5. Is the cause(s) something that is: 
7 
Outside of you 1 2 3 
6. Is the cause(s) something that is: 
Variable over time 1 2 3 
7. Is the cause(s): 
Something about you 
9 8 7 
8. Is the cause(s) something that is: 
Changeable 1 2 
9. Is the cause(s) something for which: 











4 3 2 
5 4 3 
5 4 3 
6 7 8 
6 7 8 
4 3 2 
5 6 7 















by you or 
other 
people 
Inside of you 






Instructions: Think about how you would cope with failing an important exam. The items 
below concern your likely coping responses. Circle one number for each of the following 
scales to indicate how likely you would adopt each strategy. 
1. I would bargain or compromise to get something positive from the situation. 
Extremely unlikely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Extremely likely 
2. I would concentrate on something good that could come out of the whole thing. 
Extremely unlikely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Extremely likely 
3. I would try not to bum my bridges behind me, but leave things open somewhat. 
Extremely unlikely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Extremely likely 
4. I would change or grow as a person in a good way. 
Extremely unlikely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Extremely likely 
5. I would make a plan of action and follow it. 
Extremely unlikely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Extremely likely 
6. I would accept the next best thing to what I want. 
Extremely unlikely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Extremely likely 
7. I would come out of this experience better than when I went in. 
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Extremely unlikely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Extremely likely 
8. I would try not to act too hastily or follow any hunch. 
Extremely unlikely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Extremely likely 
9. I would change something so things would tum out all right. 
Extremely unlikely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Extremely likely 
10. I would just take things one step at a time. 
Extremely unlikely l 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Extremely likely 
11. I know what has to be done, so I would double my efforts and try harder to make things work. 
Extremely unlikely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Extremely likely 
12. I would come up with a couple of different solutions to the problem. 
Extremely unlikely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Extremely likely 
13. I would accept my strong feelings, but won't let them interfere with other things too much. 
Extremely unlikely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Extremely likely 
14. I would change something about myself so I can deal with the situation better. 
Extremely unlikely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Extremely likely 
15. I would stand my ground and fight for what I want. 
Extremely unlikely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Extremely likely 
16. I would talk to someone to find out about the situation. 
Extremely unlikely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Extremely likely 
17. I would accept sympathy and understanding from someone. 
Extremely unlikely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Extremely likely 
18. I would get professional help and do what they recommend. 
Extremely unlikely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Extremely likely 
19. I would talk to someone who can do something about the problem. 
Extremely unlikely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Extremely likely 
20. I would ask someone I respect for advice and follow it. 
Extremely unlikely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Extremely likely 
21. I would talk to someone about how I am feeling. 
Extremely unlikely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Extremely likely 
22. I would blame myself. 
Extremely unlikely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Extremely likely 
23. I would criticize or lecture myself. 
Extremely unlikely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Extremely likely 
24. I would realize I brought the problem on myself. 
Extremely unlikely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Extremely likely 
25. I would hope a miracle would happen. 
Extremely unlikely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Extremely likely 
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26. I would wish I was a stronger person- more optimistic and forceful. 
Extremely unlikely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Extremely likely 
27. I would wish I could change what had happened. 
Extremely unlikely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Extremely likely 
28. I would wish I could change the way that I felt. 
Extremely unlikely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Extremely likely 
29. I would daydream or imagine a better time or place than the one I am in. 
Extremely unlikely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Extremely likely 
30. I would fantasize or wish about how things might turn out. 
Extremely unlikely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Extremely likely 
31. I would think about fantastic or unreal things (like perfect revenge or finding a million dollars) that 
make me feel better. 
Extremely unlikely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Extremely likely 
32. I would wish the situation would go away or somehow be finished. 
Extremely unlikely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Extremely likely 
33. I would go on as if nothing has happened. 
Extremely unlikely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Extremely likely 
34. I would feel bad that I can't avoid the problem. 
Extremely unlikely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Extremely likely 
35. I would keep my feelings to myself. 
Extremely unlikely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Extremely likely 
36. I would sleep more than usual. 
Extremely unlikely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Extremely likely 
3 7. I would get mad at the people or things that cause the problem. 
Extremely unlikely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Extremely likely 
38. I would try to forget the whole thing. 
Extremely unlikely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Extremely likely 
39. I would try to make myself feel better by eating, drinking, smoking, taking medications. 
Extremely unlikely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Extremely likely 
40. I would avoid being with people in general. 
Extremely unlikely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Extremely likely 
41. I would keep others from knowing how bad things are. 
Extremely unlikely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Extremely likely 
42. I would refuse to believe it had happened. 
Extremely unlikely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Extremely likely 
Thankyou for helping me with my thesis, I truly appreciate your contribution. 
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Appendix B. 
Descriptive Variables. 
Table 6. Shows the minimum, maximum, mean, and standard deviation for all 
the variables used in the present research. 
Variable Minimum Maximum Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Age 17 54 24.13 7.10 
Gender 0 1 .47 .50 
Stress1 3 9 7.21 1.43 
Stress2 2 9 7.07 1.51 
Stress3 1 9 7.40 1.52 
Stress4 2 9 7.34 1.43 
Stress5 2 9 7.11 1.47 
Stress6 2 9 7.16 1.55 
Total Stress 23 54 43.30 7.03 
Attr1 1 9 5.93 1.81 
Attr2 1 9 6.50 1.80 
Attr3 1 9 3.74 1.88 
Attr4 1 9 6.52 1.86 
Attr5 1 9 6.03 1.63 
Attr6 1 9 3.57 1.74 
Attr7 1 9 6.25 1.67 
Attr8 1 8 2.74 1.54 
Attr9 1 9 6.52 1.88 
Locus of Causality 4 27 18.20 4.26 
Stability 3 20 10.06 3.80 
Controllability 4 18 13.04 2.86 
Maladaptive attribution 14 56 32.14 8.28 
Cope1 1 9 5.06 2.32 
Cope2 1 9 5.62 2.23 
Cope3 1 9 6.23 1.77 
Cope4 1 9 5.98 1.97 
Copes 1 9 6.32 2.09 
Cope6 1 9 5.24 2.18 
Cope? 1 9 5.56 2.17 
Copes 1 9 5.73 1.75 
Cope9 1 9 6.89 1.64 
Cope10 1 9 6.51 1.81 
Cope11 2 9 6.83 1.72 
Cope12 2 9 6.62 1.59 
Cope13 1 9 5.75 1.95 
Cope14 1 9 5.86 1.96 
Cope15 1 9 6.06 1.84 
Cope16 1 9 6.54 2.14 
Cope17 1 9 5.62 2.39 
Cope18 1 9 4.61 2.65 
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Cope19 1 9 5.96 2.34 
Cope20 1 9 6.25 2.02 
Cope21 1 9 6.10 2.56 
Cope22 1 9 6.59 2.13 
Cope23 1 9 5.95 2.24 
Cope24 1 9 6.65 1.85 
Cope25 1 9 4.88 3.03 
Cope26 1 9 5.29 2.45 
Cope27 1 9 6.72 2.26 
Cope28 1 9 5.78 2.27 
Cope29 1 9 5.24 2.75 
Cope30 1 9 5.28 2.51 
Cope31 1 9 4.70 2.68 
Cope32 1 9 5.88 2.38 
Cope33 1 9 5.85 2.17 
Cope34 1 9 5.31 2.27 
Cope35 1 9 5.12 2.53 
Cope36 1 9 3.88 2.41 
Cope37 1 9 4.44 2.39 
Cope38 1 9 5.48 2.24 
Cope39 1 9 4.64 2.83 
Cope40 1 9 3.54 2.17 
Cope41 1 9 5.29 2.46 
Cope42 1 9 7.16 2.10 
Emotional coping 17 105 66.05 19.19 
Problem coping 37 139 95.62 17.96 
Seeking social support 24 81 53.40 11.88 
